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Abstract
Pricing and revenue management are two essential levers to optimize the sales of an
airline's seat inventory and maximize revenues. Over the past few decades, they have
generated a great deal of research but have typically been studied and optimized sep-
arately. On the one hand, the pricing process focused on demand segmentation and
optimal fares, regardless of any capacity constraints. On the other hand, researchers
in revenue management developed algorithms to set booking limits by fare product,
given a set of fares and capacity constraints.
This thesis develops several approaches to solve for the optimal fares and book-
ing limits jointly and simultaneously. The underlying demand volume in an airline
market is modeled as a function of the fares. We propose an initial approach to the
two-product, two-period revenue optimization problem by first assuming that the de-
mand is deterministic. We show that the booking limit on sales of the lower-priced
product is unnecessary in this case, allowing us to simplify the optimization problem.
We then develop a stochastic optimization model and analyze the combined im-
pacts of fares and booking limits on the total number of accepted bookings when
the underlying demand is uncertain. We demonstrate that this joint optimization ap-
proach can provide a 3-4% increase in revenues from a traditional pricing and revenue
management practices.
The stochastic model is then extended to the joint pricing and seat inventory
control optimization problem for booking horizons involving more than two booking
periods, as is the case in reality. A generalized methodology for optimization is pre-
sented, and we show that the complexity of the joint optimization problem increases
substantially with the number of booking periods. We thus develop three heuristics.
Simulations for a three-period problem show that all heuristics outperform the deter-
ministic optimization model. In addition, two of the heuristics can provide revenues
close to those obtained with the stochastic model.
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This thesis provides a basis for the integration of pricing and revenue management.
The combined effects of fares and booking limits on the number of accepted bookings,
and thus on the revenues, are explicitly taken into account in our joint optimization
models. We showed that the proposed approaches can further enhance revenues.
Thesis Supervisor: Peter P. Belobaba
Title: Principal Research Scientist of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Pricing and revenue management are essential for an airline to maximize its rev-
enues. The goal of pricing is to improve revenues by designing an appropriate set of
fare products. A fare product is a combination of a price, also called a fare, and an
assortment of travel constraints and service amenities. Each fare product is designed
for and targeted toward a specific group of travellers. The probably most well-known
two groups are the business travellers on one side and the leisure travellers on the
other. By offering various fare products, the airline intends to force some passengers
with travel constraints and a high willingness-to-pay to buy high revenue products,
without deterring all other passengers from booking seats.
Revenue management, on the other hand, improves the airline's revenues by set-
ting limits on the maximum number of seats to be sold for each fare product, especially
the low revenue ones. The airline can only offer a fixed, predetermined, number of
seats. Some booking requests will generally have to be rejected due to a lack of ca-
pacity, and it is therefore important for the airline to ensure that as few high-revenue
requests are rejected as possible. To do so, limits on the number of low-revenue
products that should be sold are set. This ensures that a minimum number of seats
is saved for the high willingness-to-pay passengers arriving late in the booking process.
Over the past few decades, pricing and revenue management have generated a
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great deal of research but have typically been studied and optimized separately. Nev-
ertheless, the two processes are interrelated and should ideally be considered and
solved for as a single optimization problem. Both pricing and revenue management
are based on an analysis of the booking patterns. Bookings are an indicator of the
underlying demand characteristics, such as demand elasticity, and are used for market
segmentation for example. On the other hand, the analysis of the demand volume
per fare product or group of fare products is the basis for setting booking limits. In
turn, both pricing and revenue management processes affect the choice set available
to a potential passenger during the booking procedure. By setting fares and travel
constraints, pricing defines the global set of options that could be available to a pas-
senger. However, booking limits may render one or more of these options unavailable
at the time of booking and therefore restrict the actual choice set of a passenger.
We could gain much insight on revenue maximization from a better understanding
of the interactions between pricing and revenue management methods. The analysis
of the combined impacts of fares and booking limits on a passenger's choice set, and
thus on the final number of accepted bookings, would enable us to further improve
the optimization process. This thesis investigates ways of analysing these two com-
ponents' combined effects on the demand, with the objective of ultimately solving
for the optimal fares and booking limits jointly and simultaneously. In our model,
the underlying demand volume is modelled as a function of fares and we focus on
determining how booking limits define the percentage of underlying demand that
will finally be accepted. Based on this insight, we formulate a revenue maximization
problem in which fares and booking limits are the decision variables.
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. We shall first detail the current
pricing and seat allocation practices and describe our research objectives. In Chapter
2, we present the literature review and explain how this dissertation complements
the existing body of work in joint pricing and seat allocation optimization. A two-
product, two-period joint pricing and seat allocation problem is then formulated in
18
Chapter 3. We first propose a deterministic model and then introduce a stochastic
approach. Finally, in Chapter 5, we suggest heuristics to tackle the multiple-time
frame optimization problem. Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and presents possible
directions for future work.
1.1 Background
Pricing and revenue management are part of airline planning, a lengthy and complex
process. Nowadays, airline planning is usually broken down into five smaller and
interdependent planning problems that are solved separately one after the other, as
shown in Figure 1-1. Fleet planning, route evaluation and schedule development are
the first steps. They focus on developing the airline's operations. These three steps
determine the air transportation service to be offered by the airline and establish
the capacity constraints. The inherent characteristics of the transportation service,
e.g. the origin and destination airports, the departure time, the total travel time,
the number of connections or the aircraft types, are all determined by the first three
steps. The goal of the last two steps, pricing and revenue management, is to then
generate and maximize revenues from the sale of the airline's seat inventory.
Pricing consists of the design of the different fare products that will be available to
each origin-destination market served by the airline. Air travel demand is defined for
an origin-destination (OD) market, consisting of a passenger's original departure city
and his final trip destination. Several itineraries, with different connecting flights,
may be possible for one OD market. During the pricing process, the total demand
for each origin-destination market is analysed and segmented. A fare product is then
designed for each identified segment. A fare product is associated with a combina-
tion of travel restrictions and service amenities, and a price. The product's fare is
set according to the estimated willingness-to-pay of the segment's passengers. Dif-
ferent restrictions and services amenities are then used as fences to deter passengers
from buying fare products with a lower fare than their estimated willingness-to-pay.
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1 - Fleet
Plnning
2 -Route
Evaluation
3 - Schedule
Development
4-Pricing
Determine fare levels, con
diferent service amenities an
for a set of fare products in al
Figure 1-1: Airline planning, a sequential approach
Product differentiation or differential pricing enables the airline to extract additional
consumer surplus from passengers. An example of a simple set of fare products, a
fare structure, is shown in Table 1.1.
Restrictions
Fare Product
1
2
3
Saturday-night
stay required
No
No
Yes
Purchase 21-day
before departure Fare ($)
No 700
Yes 450
Yes 300
Table 1.1: Example of a fare structure
Once the complete set of fare products is defined, the revenue management pro-
cess determines the maximum number of bookings to accept for each fare product in
20
Pricing
Define travel mfi!l #
Irrestrictions & service Set fare levels
am eniti es for p rod ucts
Fare Products
Revenue Management
------------------------------------ 
-------------------- I
Average Forecast Set bookinghistorical booking Demndliit
data by fare product
L ---------------------------- 
-------------------
Figure 1-2: Overview of the current approach to pricing and revenue management
order to maximize the airline's expected revenues, as shown in Figure 1-2. Revenue
management systems can forecast the demand for each fare product and compute
the different booking limits. Several optimization techniques have been developed to
calculate the appropriate levels of protection.
One aspect of revenue management is overbooking. It was first developed in the
1960's and enabled airlines to account for the no-show behaviour of a proportion of
passengers. With overbooking, more bookings than can physically be accommodated
are accepted, in an attempt the reduce the impacts of the very few passengers that
may decide not to travel at the very last minute. Another aspect of revenue manage-
ment is seat allocation. If too many seats are sold at a discounted fare and the plane
fills up, passengers with the willingness to pay the traditional full fare can be de-
nied their booking request, which represents a revenue loss for the airline. The need
to protect seats for later booking but higher revenue passengers triggered research
on seat allocation. The latest research developments in the field concern demand
forecasting and seat allocation, the main focus of this study. An example of a set
of booking limits is shown in Table 1.2. In this example, as soon as the 3 01h Fare
21
Product 3 booking is accepted, the product becomes unavailable. Similarly, only 40
bookings can be accepted for Fare Product 2. On the other hand, Fare Product 1
remains available throughout the entire selling period, unless the plane fills up.
Restrictions
Saturday-night Purchase 21-day
Fare Product stay required before departure Fare ($)
1 No No 700
2 No Yes 450
3 Yes Yes 300
Nested
Booking
Limits
100
60
20
Table 1.2: Example of booking limits for a fare structure (capacity = 100 seats)
Pricing and revenue management have traditionally been considered separately,
both from a theoretical and practical point of view. These two fields have indeed gen-
erated much interest from the research community over the years but few researchers
have considered the two fields jointly. At the same time, the pricing department and
the revenue management department of an airline are usually two distinct depart-
ments. Although many airlines have tried to integrate these two departments, most
still have two distinct systems in place.
1.2 The Evolution of Pricing and Seat Allocation
Practices
Before the deregulation of the industry in the United States in 1978, airlines were not
able to freely set their own prices. The US Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was the
entity setting the fares of the interstate airlines. To do so, the CAB used a simple
cost-based approach: prices were computed in order to cover the operating cost of the
airlines and ensure a profit margin. Fares for the different origin-destination markets
were based on distance. Only one fare product was offered for a given flight in the
22
economy class.
In 1977, shortly before deregulation, American Airlines was allowed by the CAB
to introduce an additional fare product, the Super Saver Fare. The new fare prod-
uct was first tested on flights between New York and both San Francisco and Los
Angeles, but it soon became available on most domestic routes. This product was
substantially cheaper than the normal economy fare but came with a 30-day advance
purchase requirement and a minimum stay of at least seven days (Bailey et al., 1985).
The average load factor of the industry in the 1970's was low, around 50% (Ben-Yosef,
2005), and legacy carriers were facing a competitive threat from charters. The expec-
tation was that cheaper fares would increase the load factor and enable the airline to
compete with lower-priced alternatives.
However, cheaper fares could also affect the revenues adversely. Indeed, discount-
ing has two effects: stimulation and diversion (Krajewski and Ritzman, 1990). Lower
prices will stimulate a previously unmet demand from price-sensitive customers. How-
ever, lower prices are also attractive to the non-price-sensitive customers who would
have flown with the airline at the non-discounted fare anyway. In order words, with
the introduction of cheaper fares, passengers can book seats at a fare level lower than
the one they would have been prepared to pay. They are thus diverted from the
original product, creating a loss in revenue (McGill and Ryzin, 1999).
The advance purchase restriction and minimum stay requirement were a first at-
tempt at lessening the impact of diversion. The restrictions created two market
segments. People who can book their flight tickets more than a month in advance
and stay at their destination for more than a week are likely to be leisure travellers
with a lower willingness-to-pay than last-minute passengers. With the restrictions
enforced by American Airlines, late booking passengers had no choice but to buy
the full fare. The new fare product enabled the airline to sell seats that would have
otherwise remained empty while still retaining the high-revenue passengers who could
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not fulfil all the restrictions.
Nevertheless, this pricing strategy of implementing restrictions cannot, alone, en-
sure an increase in revenue. The demand for the discounted fare could potentially
fill up a flight long before departure, leaving no seats to late booking higher-fare pas-
sengers. Some seats should therefore be protected for full fare passengers who book
later and generate more revenues. There were no simple rules to determine the right
number of seats to save for full-fare passengers. The introduction of this second fare
product marked the beginning of the development of seat allocation models.
Yet, despite the fact that the effectiveness of a fare structure depends partly on
the ability to set good booking limits, the progress made in the revenue management
field was never the driver for change and innovation in the airlines' pricing strategies.
In 1985, American Airlines announced the introduction of a new fare product,
the "Ultimate Supersaver Fare". The ultimate supersaver fare offered up to a 74%
discount from the regular coach fare, an unprecedented discount. The new fares were
subject to a new restriction, on top of the then usual 30-day advance purchase require-
ment and a Saturday-night minimum stay. 50% of the ultimate supersaver fare was
non-refundable. This latter restriction enabled the legacy carrier to further segment
the domestic market. American Airlines was facing the rapid and successful growth
of the low cost carrier People Express. The introduction of the ultimate supersaver
fare was the traditional airline's response to the threat of the low cost competitor
(Ben-Yosef, 2005).
In the following years, the complexity of the fare structures put in place by the
airlines kept increasing. This trend was hastened by the development of computer
reservation systems, enhancing airlines' ability to record and analyse booking data.
Different types of restrictions were implemented as fences to prevent high-revenue
passengers from buying lower fares. Advance purchase requirements were combined
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with minimum stay restrictions, cancellation policies and non-refundable conditions.
The pricing strategy of the legacy carriers grew more and more complex in an attempt
to refine the demand segmentation.
This trend was interrupted by the rapid growth of a new generation of low-cost
carriers. These new entrants challenged the pricing practices imposed by the legacy
carriers over the years. While the low-cost carriers still offered a large number of fares,
they significantly reduced their price range. In addition, they entered the market with
simplified fare structures. While most tickets on low-cost carriers were non-refundable
and had rescheduling fees, they did not require a Saturday-night stay. In fact, most
of the low-cost airlines removed the minimum stay requirement altogether, effectively
offering one-way tickets only. The new entrants chose to base their customer segmen-
tation strategy mainly on the advance purchase requirement, an easy to understand
rule for the travellers.
Faced with the rapid and threatening expansion of the low-cost carriers, some
legacy airlines reviewed their strategy. In 2005, Delta Air Lines announced the re-
moval of the minimum stay requirement on all its US domestic markets altogether.
The legacy carrier was struggling and the removal of the restriction was an attempt
at recapturing passengers (Shaw, 2007).
A new trend was initiated in 2007 with the emergence of the fare structure now
called "Fare Families". A few airlines chose to reduce the number of fare products
they offered altogether. A handful of products with clearly differentiated restrictions
and service amenities were identified and then branded. The branded products are
the same across the markets. However, their prices can vary over time and by markets.
Over the years, the airlines have applied marketing principles and segmented the
demand as much as possible by combining various types of restrictions and amenities.
The major transitions were always the responses to a competitive threat.
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Revenue management was most likely another factor of success, even if progress
in the seat allocation field was never the driver for pricing changes. Pricing evolved
irrespective of, and usually more quickly than, revenue management. Similarly, rev-
enue management was unaffected by the changes in the fare structures offered by the
airlines. As airlines implemented fare families, for example, very few new revenue
management models were developed.
The objective of revenue management is to maximize the revenues of an airline by
making some seats available at a lower fare to passengers who would not have trav-
elled otherwise, while protecting seats for passengers with a higher willingness-to-pay
but a later time arrival in the booking system. Revenue management is required
only if there are at least two fare products competing for the same resource, a finite
number of seats.
From the outset, technology did not permit to assess each request separately, one
at a time. Durham (1995) reported that a computer reservations system may have to
handle more than five thousand booking requests per second at certain peak times.
The individual real time assessment of each request was infeasible and revenue man-
agement focused on recommending booking limits by fare product for periods of a
few hours to a few days. The status of each fare product was updated on a periodic
basis.
The initial revenue management systems focused on optimizing the revenues for
each flight leg independently. The systems computed the booking limits for each fare
product on a leg. They were developed for the first type of fare structures of the
airline industry: a limited number of fare products with clearly differentiated restric-
tions. In these revenue management systems, the demand for each fare product was
modelled by a Gaussian distributed random variable and the demands were assumed
to be independent. The possible diversion of a passenger from the full fare product to
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a lower fare product was not considered. The assumptions were intended for math-
ematical and programming convenience, but nonetheless led to impressive revenue
gains for the airlines.
The success of airline revenue management was widely reported. American Air-
lines estimated the benefit of such techniques at $1.4 billion over a period of three
years (Smith et al., 1992), further stimulating the development and implementation
of revenue management methods. More advanced systems were designed to address
the broader issue of network revenue optimization.
As airlines developed hubs and expanded their network, the number of connect-
ing passengers increased tremendously. The origin-destination fare product sold to a
connecting passenger depends on the availability of seats on each of the connecting
flights. This creates an interdependence among flights. Considering the capacity of
different flight legs independently to optimize the airline's total revenue becomes sub-
optimal. Flight leg heuristics were extended to origin-destination control mechanisms
to account for some network effects.
Later on, researchers suggested modifications to take into account the possible
diversion of passengers to a lower fare product when determining the booking limits.
However, despite the tremendous evolution of the pricing strategies over the years,
the research on seat allocation optimization models remained heavily based on the
initial fully restricted fare structures.
1.3 Research Motivation and Objectives
The need for seat allocation controls materialized as soon as the airlines started of-
fering more than one fare product to their passengers and the possibility that the
demand may exceed capacity arose. As the airlines kept widening their array of fare
products, the problem of setting booking limits on each fare product became a real
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challenge and drew the attention of the research community.
The first revenue management approaches suggested by researchers were designed
for the contemporary restricted fare structure. This fare structure relied on many
different types of travel restrictions, such as the advance purchase requirement, the
minimum length of stay restriction or the Saturday night stay requirement, combined
with different fare levels. The demands for each fare product was assumed to be
independent.
When the minimum stay requirement was temporarily removed in 2005 by Delta
Air Lines, the inherent characteristics of the fare structure changed. The choice of
fare products for the potential passengers was not restricted by the length of stay
anymore and this change affected the consumers' booking patterns. Most passengers
who used not to be able to meet the length of stay requirement and thus used to
have to buy less restricted more expensive fare products were suddenly able to book
much lower fare products. A large part of the demand for the higher fare products
was diverted to the lower ones, dramatically changing the booking patterns which
are the basis for the revenue management analysis. The revenue management pro-
cess incorporated the updated average fares and some adjustments were implemented
to take into account the possible passenger diversion between fare products. Nev-
ertheless, the underlying models remained mainly unchanged. Similarly, as airlines
implemented fare families, very few new revenue management models were developed.
The following question is then raised: can the pricing and revenue management
processes be addressed jointly to further maximize revenues? While fares do consti-
tute an important input for seat allocation optimizers, they are determined during
the pricing process. Fare levels are frequently updated, but are changed irrespective
of the work done downstream to set the booking limits. On the other hand, the fares
are used as fixed inputs by the seat allocation systems. The booking limit for each
fare product is determined and implemented assuming fixed, averaged, fares. Intro-
28
ducing fares as an additional decision variable in revenue management and solving
jointly for fares and booking limits could further increase revenues. The goal of this
research is to develop a method to jointly optimize pricing and seat allocation.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 presents a literature
review of pricing and revenue management methods. We shall first start with the
description of the evolution of pricing techniques. We will then turn to the develop-
ments in the revenue management field, by focusing first on forecasting methodologies
and then seat allocation mechanisms. The third part of the chapter is dedicated to
the recent work on joint pricing and seat allocation optimization.
In Chapter 3, we formulate the two-product, two-period joint pricing and seat
allocation problem. We propose a first approach to solving this problem by first as-
suming that the demand is deterministic. The deterministic model is discussed and
its performance analysed through a numerical example.
Chapter 4 presents a stochastic approach to the joint optimization problem. The
demand is assumed to be a uniformly distributed random variable and a geometrical
analogy is used to express the objective revenue function. The stochastic approach
simultaneously computes the fares and the booking limit that maximize the total rev-
enues. Simulations show that the proposed approach performs well when compared
to a traditional revenue management approach.
We then extend the approach to the multiple-time frame joint pricing and seat
allocation optimization problem. A generalized methodology is presented in Chapter
5. In light of the complexity of the objective function arising from the consideration
of multiple time frames, we derive and test three heuristics to the joint optimization
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problem.
Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and draws conclusions from them. We will
also discuss practical applications and possible future research directions.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
A considerable body of work exists on airline pricing and seat allocation optimiza-
tion. Whitin published a single period pricing model in 1955 and Littlewood first
considered the two-class, single leg, seat allocation problem in 1972. Nevertheless, it
is only in the mid nineties that the problem of joint pricing and seat allocation for
perishable goods raised the attention of researchers.
In this chapter, we first review the pricing literature. An overview of the revenue
management research on forecasting and seat allocation is then provided. Finally, we
discuss the recent developments in joint pricing and seat allocation.
2.1 Pricing
Research on airline pricing has been undertaken from many different perspectives.
Economists, marketing scientists and operations researchers have all studied the sub-
ject.
The existing body of work from an economic point of view is very large. Schmalensee
(1981) studied the impact of an airline's pricing strategy on social welfare. Borenstein
(1985) used spatial models to analyse price discrimination in oligopolistic markets.
Borenstein and Rose (1991) suggested price dispersion as an indicator of price dis-
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crimination in the US airline industry.
Studies of pricing strategies in the context of revenue optimization stemmed from
research on production-pricing problems. The airline pricing problem was first con-
sidered as a special case of the classical newsvendor problem where the production
cost was fixed and the product was perishable with no penalty cost or salvage value.
Whitin (1955),Mills (1959, 1962), Karlin and Carr (1962), Zabel (1970) and Hempe-
nius (1970) worked on single-period newsvendor models that included both the price
and the inventory level as a decision variable. Their studies only concerned the single-
product case. Petruzzi and Dada (1999) presented an overview of the research on this
field.
Karlin and Carr (1962), Nevins (1966), Zabel (1972), Thomas (1974), Thowsen
(1975), Petruzzi and Dada (1999), Federgruen and Heching (1999) extended the scope
of the research to a multi-period stocking and pricing problem. The planning period
was segmented and the unsold products at the end of a time period were available to
meet the demand of the subsequent time periods. Each time period was associated
with a pricing and stocking decision. The studies remained focus on the single-product
case.
Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) and Zhao and Zheng (2000) addressed the problem
of dynamically pricing a given inventory of a single product. The demand was price
sensitive and stochastic and the objective was to maximize the expected revenues.
Optimal prices were functions of the inventory level and the length of the planning
period. Chatwin (2000) and Feng and Gallego (2000) restricted the number of allow-
able prices to a finite set. Gallego and van Ryzin (1997), Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis
(2000) suggested to extend the dynamic pricing models to the multi-product case.
The various products shared the same supply of resources. The two groups of re-
searchers proposed heuristics based on deterministic models.
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2.2 Revenue Management
Revenue management commonly encompasses overbooking, forecasting and seat al-
location. The focus of this dissertation is forecasting and seat allocation.
2.2.1 Forecasting
Work on airline forecasting for revenue management dates back to the 1960's. The
first efforts focused on modelling the demand distribution and the passenger arrival
processes. Beckmann and Bobkoski (1958), Beckmann (1958), Lyle, Belobaba (1987a)
discussed the reasonable fit of the Poisson, negative binomial, gamma or normal prob-
ability distributions.
Later on, researchers proposed remedial measures to the truncation of the observed
historical demand due to booking limits and capacity constraints in the airline indus-
try. The distinction between aggregate and disaggregate forecasting emerged. Taneja
(1978) and Sa (1987) provided an overview of aggregate forecasting techniques. Lee
(1990) discussed issues in disaggregate forecasting. Later work by Weatherford et al.
(1993) took into account the possible diversion of a passenger in the two-product
case. Some passengers might indeed be willing to pay the higher fare product but
will always buy the lower available fare product. There was diversion when those
passengers ended up buying the higher fare product because the other one was not
available.
2.2.2 Seat Allocation
Littlewood (1972) first studied the seat allocation problem for the two-class, single
flight leg case and proposed a simple rule to accept or reject bookings. A discount
fare booking should only be accepted if the revenue it generates exceeds the expected
revenue of a future request for the full fare. Belobaba (1987b, 1989, 2002) extended
the principle to the multiple-fare products problem with the expected marginal seat
revenue heuristic (ESMRa and EMSRb). This method did not yield the optimal
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booking limits, except in the two-class problem, but provided reasonable approxima-
tions in typical situations. However, the heuristic could realistically be implemented
and was therefore widely adopted by airlines. Other approaches to derive the optimal
booking limits for single-leg flights were developed by Curry (1990), Wollmer (1992),
Brumelle and McGill (1993) and Robinson (1995). These methods were referred to
as leg-based approaches in the literature. They aimed at optimizing the expected
revenue from seat allocation for each flight leg independently.
In the 1980's, airlines rapidly expanded their use of the hub-and-spoke network
model and it soon supplanted the point-to-point service model. The number of con-
necting passengers increased significantly, creating network effects: each flight leg
carried a mix of local and connecting passengers. The yield of a connecting passenger
might on a particular flight leg be lower than that of the passenger sitting next to
him and yet the total itinerary contribution to the airline might be greater. On the
other hand, a connecting passenger may displace two local passengers who could have
generated more total revenue for the airline. The conventional leg-based approach to
revenue management failed to address these two fundamental network issues.
Researchers worked on developing origin-destination control mechanisms for net-
works. The first approaches were based on conventional leg-based methods. Instead
of setting booking limits for fare products, controls were set for "value classes". All
the itineraries that comprised the same particular flight leg were ranked, and the fare
products of these itineraries were then mapped to buckets according to their value
to the network. Each bucket was a value class. The leg-based heuristics were then
used to compute the booking limits of each value class. American Airlines called the
clustering process "virtual nesting". Belobaba (1989), Smith and Penn (1988) and
Williamson (1992) presented different mapping techniques. Virtual nesting addressed
the first network issue by taking into account the possibility that a low yield connect-
ing passenger on a flight leg may in fact be generating more revenue overall than a
local passenger.
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More advanced network optimization techniques were then developed to tackle
the second network issue mentioned previously, which is the displacement of two
local passengers by a connecting passenger. Glover et al. (1982) and Curry (1990)
provided mathematical programming formulations for network flow models. These
results were used to estimate the displacement cost of an itinerary. Smith and Penn
(1988), Simpson (1989) and Williamson (1992) developed bid-price methods in which
a booking is accepted only if its total net contribution is greater than the estimated
displacement costs, also called the bid-price.
2.3 Joint Pricing and Seat Allocation
To our knowledge, the literature on joint pricing and seat allocation for perishable
assets is very sparse.
Weatherford (1997) emphasized the importance of considering prices as part of
the overall optimization problem and suggests including them as decision variables in
the seat allocation problem. The study focused on the case of a single flight leg with
at least two fare products. The demand for each product was assumed to be normally
distributed, with a mean a linear function of the product's own fare as well as the
next higher and lower fares. The selling period was not divided into subintervals
which greatly reduced the complexity of the problem. For example, there were only
three decision variables in the case of the two fare product problem: two prices and
one booking limit.
The analysis was divided into three parts. First, Weatherford assumed that the
inventory was partitioned and that there were no diversion: passengers with the
willingness-to-pay the higher fare do not consider the lower fare product. These two
assumptions are released, one after the other, in the two subsequent parts of the analy-
sis. This was the only case in which the closed form expression of the expected revenue
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could be derived. In the last part, the more realistic behavior of a high willingness-
to-pay passenger buying a lower fare product if it is available was taken into account.
However, it was assumed that the demand for the different products follows a strict
arrival order, with the lowest fare product demand arriving first. Numerical methods
were used to find the optimal solutions and the analysis was restricted to two and
three fare products, due to the increased complexity of the problem.
Kuyumcu and Garcia-Diaz (2000) tackled the joint pricing and seat allocation
problem with the objective of broadening the scope of the problem by taking into
account the entire airline network in the decision making process. The analysis was
not focused on the revenues generated by one single flight leg, but by all the airline's
origin-destination (OD) itineraries that constituted the network.
The demands for each OD and fare class combinations were assumed to be mu-
tually independent and normally distributed. There were no explicit hypothesis re-
garding the relationship between the demands and fares, or any other fare product
characteristics. The demands were known, through the analysis of historical data,
and the objective function was the system-wide expected marginal seat revenue. A
graph theoretical approach was proposed to determine the subgroup of fare products
that would maximize the revenues, given an initial set of fare products. The seat
allocation technique used was the standard leg-based revenue management method
EMSR, even if the focus was the network.
The fares remained exogenous variables to the decision process in this study. The
approach simplified the optimization problem by reducing the number of fare prod-
ucts available, and then relied on standard EMSR to set booking limits for each OD
itinerary.
Bertsimas and de Boer (2002) also analyzed the joint pricing and seat allocation
optimization problem in a network. In this study too, it was assumed that the de-
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mand for each fare product was uncertain and that its expectation only depended on
its own price. In the first part of the paper, the selling time period was not divided
into subintervals. The analysis was first reduced to the case of a single fare prod-
uct. It was shown that the objective function could be concave with respect to the
production level for a certain set of probability distributions, including the uniform
and normal distributions. The authors proposed an iterative non-linear optimization
algorithm to determine the optimal fares and allocation policies for all fare products.
The second part of the analysis focused on the multi-period optimization prob-
lem. Three heuristics were presented. In the first one, the demand for a product was
first aggregated over all the periods considered, which reduced the problem to the
single time period problem. In the second heuristic, the inventory was partitioned,
which also reduced the problem to a larger single time period problem. In the third
heuristic, the allocation policy was set first and the optimization then only concerned
pricing.
Cote et al. (2003) proposed a model with the capability of jointly solving the
pricing and seat allocation problem in a network with a competitor. The approach
was based on bilevel programming: the airline was assumed to know how its com-
petitor would react and integrate this behavior in its decision process. The main
objective of the study was to propose an approach to determine the optimal fares
across the network, knowing how the competitor would react. The main variables of
interest were the fares, not the booking limits. The demand for each fare product and
origin-destination itinerary combination was assumed to be fully known: there was no
randomness or hypothesis regarding the relationship between the fare products' char-
acteristics. The inventory was partitioned and the model does not allow for diversion.
The booking limits are obtained a posteriori. Indeed, once the two airlines pricing
policy was known, the booking limits were simply set equal to difference between the
flight's capacity and the higher fare products' demands.
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Chew et al. (2009) developed a joint optimization approach for a single product
with a two period lifetime. The demand for the product was assumed to be uncertain,
and its expectation was a linear function of its fare. Based on the concave proper-
ties of the objective revenue function, the authors suggested an iterative procedure
to compute the optimal fare and booking limit. The extension to the multiple time
period problem was then considered. As the concavity of the expected revenue func-
tion did not always hold, three heuristics were suggested. In the first heuristic, the
inventory was no longer nested but partitioned. In the other two heuristics, the time
intervals were grouped into two time periods. The two-period procedure was then
applied.
Figure 2-1 summarizes the main aspects of joint pricing and seat allocation opti-
mization privileged by each one of the mentioned studies and thus provides a visual
help to identify the gaps in the literature. Weatherford (1997) was the only one to
consider the demands for different fare products to be mutually dependent and to
solve for the optimal fares and booking limits simultaneously. Kuyumcu and Garcia-
Diaz (2000), Whitin (1955), and Cote et al. (2003) chose to approach the optimization
at the network level instead and the focus of Cote et al. (2003) was mostly the com-
petitive effect. None of these three studies extended the work of Weatherford (1997)
by introducing dependent demands. For Chew et al. (2009), the emphasized aspect
is the ability to update the fare of a product several times over the booking process.
Figure 2-1 also shows how this dissertation complements the existing body of
work on joint pricing and seat allocation optimization. Our intent is not to directly
analyze the impacts of fares and booking limits on the demand at a network level or
in a competitive environment. Instead, we revert to the base case, the single-flight leg
case, but assume that the demands for the fare products considered are dependent.
Furthermore, we divide the selling period into sub-intervals to model the fact that
airlines can increase their revenues by changing their fares several times over the
booking period. Our study combines the joint pricing and seat allocation aspects that
were the focus of Weatherford (1997) and Chew et al. (2009). This dissertation could
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then be the starting point for more comprehensive research encompassing network or
competitive effects.
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Chapter 3
Deterministic Approach to Joint
Pricing and Seat Allocation
Optimization
In this chapter, we develop a deterministic model of joint pricing and seat allocation
optimization. In this approach, the prices of different fare products offered by the
airline are no longer considered as exogenous variables to the seat inventory problem.
Instead, the demand for fare products is modelled as a function of the fare products'
prices, which thus become decision variables, as booking limits are.
This newly formulated optimization problem involves a large number of variables.
We initially facilitate an analysis by assuming that the demand is deterministic. This
highly simplifying assumption, which is relaxed later, allows us to gain insight into
the optimization problem. We will show that without demand uncertainty, the fares
can be used as the sole lever to match inventory and demand. The deterministic
assumption will therefore allow us to set aside the booking limit in a first time and
find a simple solution to the optimization problem. This shall constitute a starting
point to observe, thanks to a numerical example, the impact of the flight capacity on
the observed demand and pave the way for the following chapter.
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We open up the chapter with a description of the problem's scope. The fare
products and their characteristics are defined. The underlying selling mechanism
used by the airline is explained. The notations used are then decrypted in Section
3.2, which allows us to then introduce the model chosen for the demand functions.
In Section 3.4, we give a detailed analysis of the resulting objective function. Finally,
we illustrate the approach with three sets of numerical simulations.
3.1 Scope of the Problem
Traditional revenue management techniques focus exclusively on booking limits for
each fare class. The objective of these techniques is to improve the total expected
revenues by determining the best booking limit for each product. In the formulation
of the traditional revenue management optimization problem, the prices of different
fare products are known and fixed and are considered as input to the problem. The
booking limits are determined given the demand estimated at those price points.
In reality, however, prices do affect the demand and thus the revenues. We believe
that the airline's revenues could be further improved by modifying the formulation of
the seat inventory optimization problem and including prices as decision variables.
To do so, we place ourselves in a single carrier, single flight, single origin-destination
(OD) market environment. The flight has a fixed capacity of C seats. This simple
context enables us to reduce the complexity of the analysis by removing competitive
or network effects.
In the OD market considered, two fare products, Fare Product 1 and Fare Prod-
uct 2, are offered by the airline. The two products provide exactly the same in-flight
service; nevertheless, these products are associated with two distinct sets of purchase
restrictions and rules, and are therefore priced differently. In our notations, Fare
Product 1 represents the more expensive, less restricted product. The other product,
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Fare Product 2, is priced lower, but in return, has additional restrictions and rules.
Since the very beginning of revenue management, both researchers and airline
managers have acknowledged that passengers booking first exhibit different behaviors
from those booking last. They have different trip purposes, different willingness-to-
pay and different tolerance regarding fare products' rules. The implementation of
restrictions, such as advance purchase requirements, was an attempt at segmenting
the demand based on those changing characteristics. A few days or weeks before the
flight departure date, the lower discounted fare would no longer be available as most
of the passengers arriving later have a willingness-to-pay closer to the higher price.
Our fare structure does not include advance purchase requirements. The two fare
products remain available throughout the entire selling period unless the flight sells
out. Instead, to take into account the changing characteristics of the passengers, we
divide the selling horizon into subintervals which allows the prices to change from one
period to the other, while keeping the restrictions unchanged. We start by dividing
the booking period into just two time frames. Increasing the number of subintervals
would result in additional decision variables and would greatly increase the complex-
ity of the problem. We will explore the multiple-time period optimization problem in
Chapter 5.
Bookings start to be accepted at the beginning of the first time frame, TF1. The
flight departs at the end of the second and last time frame, TF2. The prices of the
two products can be modified at the start of each new time period. In the notation, xt
and yt represent, for each TFt, the prices of Fare Product 1 and Fare Product 2, re-
spectively. These price points are decision variables. The set of restrictions and rules
associated with each fare product are set by the airline. These restrictions remain
the same throughout the entire booking period: they are constant characteristics of
the two fare products.
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Figure 3-1: Example of the two fare products, their restrictions, fares and booking limit
In addition, the airline can limit the total number of seats to be sold in the first
time frame. This should enable the airline to protect a minimum number of seats for
TF2 passengers, which are usually less price sensitive and therefore more likely to
accept to pay a higher fare. We assume that the total capacity is nested between the
two time frames: unsold seats from the first time frame are available for booking in
the second time frame. The flight capacity caps the total number of bookings that
can be accepted over the course of the two time frames. The booking limit imposed
by the airline on the two products in the first time frame is noted zi and is the fifth
decision variable of our optimization problem. The flight capacity C is, on the other
hand, fixed.
An example of the two fare products and their possible restrictions is provided in
Figure 3-1.
The joint pricing and seat allocation problem modeled here consists of maximizing
the total revenues generated by the sale of the two fare products during the two time
periods by optimizing the four price points and the first time frame's booking limit.
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3.2 Notations
The following notations are used throughout this and the next chapters:
" C is the capacity of the flight.
* xt is the price of Fare Product 1 in TFt
" yt is the price of Fare Product 2 in TFt. We impose that for all t, yt < xt.
* zi is the booking limit corresponding to TF1, i.e. the total number of seats
that the airline is willing to sell in the first time frame. The number of seats
available for booking limit in the second time frame TF2 is at least equal to
C - z 1 .
* nxt is the demand for Fare Product 1 in TFt.
* ny,t is the demand for Fare Product 2 in TFt.
" ntotdt is the combined demand for fare products 1 and 2 in TFt.
" pt is the probability that a random passenger chooses Fare Product 1 in TFt.
" Rt is the total revenues generated by the combined sale of the two fare products
in TFt.
* Rta is the total revenues generated by the sale of the two fare products over
the entire booking period.
3.3 Modeling the Demand for Two Fare Products
The total demand for the two fare products is approximated by a linear function of
the lower available price:
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ntota,i (xi, yi) = ai - #iyj
with aj,#j > 0
and yj E 0, 
The assumption that the demand is a linear function of the price is very common
in the literature (Weatherford, 1997; Chew et al., 2009). The second part of the as-
sumption on the lower available price is a good approximation for large Fare Product
2 demand relative to Fare Product 1 demand, as we will show.
We allow for diversion: if passengers can meet all the restrictions attached to
the lower fare product, they will buy it, even if they have the willingness-to-pay for
the higher-end fare product, regardless of the product preference. Hence, passengers
book the fare product with the lower available price and the most restrictions they
can accept. The passengers buying Fare Product 1 are therefore mostly "business"
travellers and are relatively price inelastic. The passengers buying Fare Product 2
are, in comparison, more price sensitive.
We further postulate that the demand of both fare products is a linear function
of the fare product's price. Examples of demand curves for the two fare products are
shown in Figure 3-2.
Let the demand function for Fare Product 2 be:
n,,i (y1) = a,, - #,,iyi
with ay,i,#,,o 0
and y 0, a
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Figure 3-2: Demand curves for the two fare products
The demand function for the higher Fare Product 1 is given by:
nx,j (xi) = ax, - pfix
with ax,j,# , 0
and xi E 0,- I
In addition, #,ix e (o).
The total, combined, demand for the two fare products thus is
ntotal,i (xi, yi) = ay,i + axi - #2,iXi - 3 ,,iyi
where #,3ix - e (o). The total demand function can therefore approximated as:
nittal,i (xi, yi) - ai - #y
The total combined demand is represented by the full blue line in Figure 3-3. The
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Figure 3-3: Combined demand curve and its approximation
approximation that we use is the blue dotted line.
The higher-end fare product passengers are taken into account through the con-
stant aei.
For simplifying purposes, most of the previous studies addressing the multiple-
product problem assume that the demands for the different products are independent
of each other (Kuyumcu and Garcia-Diaz, 2000; Bertsimas and de Boer, 2002; Cote
et al., 2003; Chew et al., 2009). In reality, the demand for a product depends not only
on the product's own price, but also on the other product's price: there is diversion
between the products. A change in the price of one of the fare products affects not
only its own demand but also the demands for the other products. It is therefore
important in the joint pricing and seat allocation approach to take this dependence
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into account.
In our model, we allow for sell-up: passengers able to meet all the restrictions of
Fare Product 2 may choose to buy the higher fare product with less restrictions. Let
pi be the probability that a passenger chooses the less restricted product: Pi = ".' .Stotal,i
We choose to express this choice probability by the binary logit model:
1
p (Xi, yj) = 1 + eai-biyi+cixi
with bi, ci > 0
The parameters ai, bi and ci should be such that for equal and reasonable values
of xi and yi, the probability is 100%.
The resulting demand for each fare product is a non-linear function of the two
prices. Both the lower and higher fares y and xi have impacts on individual demands.
Previous works on the joint pricing and seat allocation optimization problem have
either assumed that the demand for a product only depended on its own price, or that
the demand for a product was a linear function of the other products' prices. Figures
3-4 and 3-5 are examples of the two fare products' demand curves, given ntota0 ,i and
pi. There is substitution between the two fare products.
The demands in the different time frames are assumed to be independent of each
other. This is a very common assumption in the literature.
In this chapter, we also assume that both the total demand and the probability
of a passenger choosing the less restricted product are deterministic. Here, neither
equation includes a random variable that would take into account the stochasticity of
the demand. This assumption greatly simplifies the joint optimization problem, with
the demand for each product entirely defined by the fares. Once the two fares are
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set, the demands are known, without any uncertainty or variability. This assumption
will be relaxed in the next chapter.
The booking limit zi
that can be accepted in
TF2 are min (ntoti,1, zi)
and flight capacity C affect the total number of bookings
the two time frames. The bookings accepted in TF1 and
and min [ntotal,2, C - min (ntotaI,, zi)] respectively.
3.4 Objective Function
The objective function is the total revenue generated by the sale of the two products
over the course of the two time frames that constitute the entire selling period:
Rtota =R 1 + R 2
with R 1  { ntota,1P1X1 + ntotal,1 (1 - pi) Y1,
zipixi + zi (1 - pi) y1,
R2 = ntotaL,2P2X2 + ntotal,2 (1 - P2) Y2,
I(C - min (ntota,1; z1)) [P2 x 2 + (1
if ntota,1 < zi;
otherwise.
if ntota,2 < C - min (ntota,1; zi);
- P2) Y2], otherwise.
The objective in this section is to demonstrate that the booking limit is unneces-
sary in the deterministic case.
Time Frame 1
Consider the first time frame, TF1. We can show that the third variable z1 is a re-
dundant variable in the deterministic case. We will also analyse the revenue function.
In this section, we will drop the index 1 to simplify the notation.
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The revenue function is given by:
R(x,y,z) =
ntotalPX + ntotal (1 - p) y,
zpx + z (1 - p) y,
if ntot1 < z,
otherwise.
(3.1)
ntotal (x, y) - a - #y
with 1
p (x, y) 1 + ea-b+cx
where a,#, b, c > 0,
and y E , -#0)
The second part of Equation 3.1 represents the case in which the total demand is
greater than the booking limit:
R (x, y, z) = zpx + z (1 - p) y
By isolating the variable z in the revenue function, we get:
R (x, y, z) = z[px + (1 - p) y]
= z -g (x,y)
where the function g represents the average fare in the time frame considered:
g (x, y) = px+ (1 - p)y
with p (x, y) =
1
1 + ea-b+J
The revenue function's maximum is not reached.
Vk > 0, p X +
k k
c b
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= p (x, y)
The function g increases in x and y. Thus:
k k
R x + --,y+ -, Z) > R (x, y, z)
Thus, for all booking limits z, the maximum of the revenue function is reached on
the boundary of the domain of definition, for ntot = z. In other words, the maximum
of the revenue function is reached for y = .
We shall now turn to the other part of Equation 3.1, representing the case in
which the total demand is below the booking limit:
R (x, y, z) - ntotalPX + ntota (1 - p) y
This function does not depend on z, but solely on x and y. Figure 3-6 is an illustra-
tion of revenues as a function of those two price points. The function is also twice
differentiable. It is neither concave nor convex.
Let (x*, y*) be the optimal solution to Equation (3.1). Then we can set z to be
equal to a - #y*.
In both considered cases, the booking limit resulting in the optimal revenues is
given by z = a - #y*. The booking limit is a redundant variable. Since the demand
is deterministic, it can simply be adjusted by changing the fares. We can ensure that
the demand does not reach the upper bound that the booking limit represents by
increasing the lower fare yi.
53
Revenues ($)
80 110 140 170 200 230
y ()
For nw =135-0.44y and
1
P= 1 +e--- "x
Figure 3-6: Example of the revenue as a function of the two fares, without a booking limit
The equivalent revenue function for TF1 is:
R (x, y) = ntapx + ntta (1 - p) y
with{
ntotsa (x, y) = a - py
1
p(xY) = 1+ ea-by+cx
where a,#P, b, c > 0,
and y E 0,)-
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Total revenues over the two time frames
These results can be generalized and applied to the second time frame. The objective
function becomes:
Rtotaj = R1 + R 2
{Ri 1 = notal,1p1X + ntotal,1 (1 - pi) y1
with ±~~~2( 2
R2 =tnota,2P2X 2 + ntotai,2 P2) Y2
The total revenue function is also concave and we therefore have a concave opti-
mization problem:
Maximize R = R1 (x1 , yi, zi) + R 2 (x 2 , Y2)
Subject to ai - #1Y1 + a 2 - #2Y2 - C < 0
with zi ai - #1y1
This is a non-linear constrained maximization problem. It is possible to use the
interior point method to find a solution.
3.5 Numerical Results
A numerical example is used to illustrate the proposed approach and gain more in-
sights into the benefits of joint pricing and seat allocation optimization.
The assumed parameters for the demands in the two time frames considered are
given in Table 3.1. The flight capacity is 100 seats. The demand level in the second
time frame is lower and less price elastic than in the first time frame, as it is usually
observed in the airline industry. The probability that a passenger will buy the higher
fare product, for a given pair of fares, increases with time, all else being equal.
The optimal deterministic solution to this joint pricing and seat allocation problem
55
TF1 TF2
ai=135 a 2 =85Total Dernand nit,It ,-15 =8
'l mi # 0.44 #2 = 0.20
ai 0.864 a2  -0.038
Probability pt b1 = -0.020 b2 = -0.016
ci = 0.009 c2 = 0.008
Table 3.1: Parameters for the demand functions
is obtained by running an interior point algorithm in
revenue is reached with the following fares:
Matlab. The maximum total
Fare Product 1
Fare Product 2
Implied booking limit
TF1
x* = $349.1
y*= $173.3
zi = 60
TF2
x* = $462.4
y2= $223.2
Table 3.2: Optimal solution to the deterministic joint pricing and seat allocation problem
Based on the assumed parameters, we can deduce the deterministic demands and
revenues expected at those fare levels, as shown in Table 3.3.
Average Fare ($)
Probability pt
Total Demand
Revenues
TF1
244
pt =40.3%
n* ,,a,1 =59.6
R* = 14,559
TF2
336
p* =47.0%
n*,e0 ,2 =40.4
Rt = 13,544
Total
n*a =100.0
R*,,t = 28,103
Table 3.3: Deterministic demand and revenues
The deterministic model results in a total number of booking requests matching
the flight capacity exactly. The optimal lower fares are such that 60 passengers shall
requests bookings in the first time frame, and 40 in the second time frame. The total
revenue generated by the two fare products is $28.1k.
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3.6 Simulations
In the previous sections, the optimization problem was formulated with a demand as-
sumed to be deterministic. We showed that this hypothesis implies that the booking
limit is zi is a redundant variable. The demand for air travel in reality is known to be
stochastic by nature. We therefore test our solution to the optimization problem in a
stochastic environment. In this last part of the chapter, we run simulations in which
the demand generated is a random variable. The set of simulations shall enable us
to assess the importance of a booking limit in a stochastic setting. We shall run a
first set of simulations without enforcing any booking limit and then a second set of
simulations with a booking limit set to z* = ai - 1yi = 60. Lastly, we will compare
the proposed joint pricing and seat allocation approach with a more traditional and
well established leg-based seat allocation method.
3.6.1 Simulations with no booking limit
In the first set of simulations, we use the fares corresponding to the deterministic op-
timal solution (see Table 3.2) without enforcing the implied booking limit of zi = 60
seats. The resulting maximum number of bookings accepted in TF1 and TF2 are
min (ntot,1, C) and min [ntotal,2, C - min (ntota,1, C)] respectively.
The total demand for the two fare products is a random variable generated at the
beginning of each time period. We will test two possible probability density functions:
a uniform and a Gaussian probability density function. Thus, for each considered sce-
nario, two distinct sets of simulations will be run. In the first set of simulations, the
demand is uniformly distributed in both time frames. In a second set of simulations,
the demand is normally distributed in both time frames. The demands for the two
time frames are independent. For both type of demands, we generate 1,000 samples.
The mean total demand is a linear function of the lower fare, yi, and we use the
same parameters, displayed in Table 3.1, to model these expected values. The stan-
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1' Generate the stochastic demandgiven thefares
n, ~ N(60,20)
T F1
2/Reject part of the demand if greater than capacity
3/Deduce revenues and remaining capacity
R= n=pIx 1 + n 1 - )y,
Remaining Capacity= C -n
4/Generatethe stochastic demand given thefares
-N(4O,12)
TF2 5/Rejectpart of the demand if greater than remaining capaciy
6/Deduce revenues
R2 = mini (n2 ,C- n,) P2X2 + min (n 2 , C - n,)(1-P 2)Y 2
Figure 3-7: Overview of the simulation process
dard deviations of the demands in TF1 and TF2 are 20 and 12 respectively, which
corresponds to about a third of the deterministic demand for each time frame. For
the normal distribution, the demand is truncated in order to prevent any instance of
negative demand. Finally, the flight capacity does not affect the probability that a
passenger chooses the higher fare product.
The simulation process is summarized in Figure 3-7. We first generate demand in
TF1 and decide how many booking requests can be accepted given the flight capacity.
Then we generate the TF2 demand, and given the remaining capacity, we determine
the number of bookings that can be accepted.
The average demands and revenues resulting from the two different sets of simu-
lations are shown in the two tables, Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. The cumulative distri-
butions of the revenues for the two types of demand, are shown in Figure 3-8. They
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Figure 3-8: Cumulative distribution functions of the revenues when no booking limit is enforced
are fairly similar.
TF1 TF2 Total
Accepted Bookings 59.1 31.1 90.2
Difference with theory -1% -23% -10%
Average Fare ($) 244 336 276
Revenues ($) 14,430 10,426 24,856
Table 3.4: Simulation results when no booking limit is enforced - uniform distribution
For both types of distributions, the accepted demand in the first time frame
matches the predicted deterministic demand. There is only a -1 to 1% relative dif-
ference with the theoretical demand of 59.6. However, in the second time frame, we
observe a large difference between the accepted demand and the predicted, under-
lying, demand. The average accepted demand in TF2 is about 31.1, which is 23%
lower than the mean underlying demand. The resulting load factor averages 90-91%.
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TF1 TF2 Total
Accepted Bookings 60.1 31.1 91.2
Difference with theory 1% -23% -9%
Average Fare ($) 244 336 276
Revenues ($) 14,684 10,423 25,107
Table 3.5: Simulation results when no booking limit is enforced - Gaussian distribution
This gap in the accepted demand, not observed in the first time frame, is due
to the flight capacity and the combined demand variability. Figure 3-9(a) shows the
distribution of the demand in TF2 given the accepted demand in TF1. In about 50%
of the samples generated, the combined demand of TF1 and TF2 exceeds the flight
capacity, represented on the figure by a red line. Thus, in about 50% of the samples
generated, part of the TF2 underlying demand was not accommodated and only the
demand matching the remaining capacity was accepted, as shown in Figure 3-9(b).
The average accepted demand is displaced and lowered by the constraint represented
by the flight capacity. This translates into a 23% loss in the second time frame's
revenues, which represents a -9% decrease in revenue overall.
The average fare in the second time frame is nevertheless higher than that of
the first time frame. We could mitigate the loss in revenue by displacing part of
the rejected demand to the first time frame. To do so, we would need to enforce a
booking limit in the first time frame, thus protecting a minimum number of seats for
the second time frame. This case will be illustrated with the next set of simulations,
where we set of limit to the number of bookings accepted in TF1.
3.6.2 Simulations with a booking limit
In the second test, we enforce the booking limit: the number of bookings accepted
in the first time frame is at most z* = 60. For a more accurate comparison with the
previous scenario, we do not regenerate the underlying demand. Only the number of
accepted bookings changes. The fares still correspond to the deterministic optimal
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Figure 3-9: Impact of the flight capacity on the accepted demands
solution.
The results are summarized in Table 3.6. Enforcing the booking limit in the first
time frame results in a 0.5-0.7% increase in the estimated average total revenues. The
results are further detailed in the Table 3.7 and Table 3.8. The revenue improvement
is driven by the increase in the accepted demand in TF2. Enforcing the booking limit
zi in the first time frame lowered the estimated expected TF1 constrained demand
from 59 to 51, a 14% decrease, which resulted in a $1950 loss in expected revenues
for the uniform distribution. However, the few seats saved in the first time frame
became available for the later arriving demand: the estimated number of bookings
increased from 31 to 37 in the second time frame. The higher fares combined with
the increase in accepted demand resulted in a $2100 gain in expected revenues in the
second time frame for the uniform distribution, eventually leading to a 0.5% increase
in total expected revenues.
The impact of the booking limit on the distribution of the accepted bookings in
both time frames is displayed in Figure 3-10. The booking limit greatly reduced the
standard deviation of the accepted bookings. However, the load factor is also reduced,
as shown in Figure 3-11, which gives an overview of the opposite changes induced by
zi on both time frames.
61
Accepted TF1 TF2
Bookings Without Wth wthout With
100T
80
..617...... 
............
40--
20--
0
Figure 3-10: Impacts of the booking limit on the accepted bookings in both time frames
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Uniform Gaussian
Demand Demand
Revenues without z1  $24,856 $25,107
Revenues with zi $24,970 $25,292
Change 0.5% 0.7%
Table 3.6: Impacts of the booking limit on the expected revenues
TF1 TF2 Total
Accepted Bookings 51.1 37.2 88.3
Difference with theory -14% -8% -11%
Difference with no z1  -14% +20% -2%
Average Fare ($) 244 336 283
Revenues ($) 12,471 12,499 24,970
Table 3.7: Simulation results with the booking limit enforced - uniform distribution
There is trade-off between the increase revenues generated by saving a seat for a
later, higher-revenue passenger, and the risk of rejecting a booking for a seat in the
first time frame that may not be sold in the end. The 0.5% increase in total revenues
may be further enhanced by another well chosen booking limit. The next chapter will
focus on determining simultaneously fares and booking limit to optimize the total
revenues in a stochastic environment.
3.6.3 Simulations with booking limits on Fare Product 2
In traditional revenue management approaches, all fare products but the highest one
have a booking limit. The objective is to ensure that only a maximum number of
discounted, or lower, fare products are sold, thus leaving at least a few seats available
for the late arriving but high revenue passengers. In our set-up, this would correspond
to imposing an additional booking limit on Fare Product 2. Capping the number of
bookings that can be accepted for Fare Product 2 in both time frames would ascertain
the prolonged availability of Fare Product 1.
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TF1 TF2 Total
Accepted Bookings 52.2 37.4 89.6
Difference with theory -12% -7% -10%
Difference with no z1  -13% +20% -2%
Average Fare ($) 244 336 282
Revenues ($) 12,751 12,541 25,292
Table 3.8: Simulation results with the booking limit enforced - Gaussian distribution
Our model does not account for this kind of booking limit. Instead we specify
a booking limit to protect seats for later time frames. We therefore do take into
account the time dimension: our model acknowledges the fact that later arriving
passengers probably have a higher willingness-to-pay than early booking passengers.
Moreover, we assume, implicitly, that this is likely to be true for both fare products.
Furthermore, our model also protects Fare Product 1 versus Fare Product 2, but
not in the traditional way: integrating pricing and revenue management allows us
to control the passenger mix thanks to the fares. In other words, including the four
fare levels as decision variables enabled us to remove the two additional booking lim-
its that would be required to mirror the traditional approach. Nevertheless, we will
test the performance of the model when these additional bookings limits are enforced.
Let Z2,TF1 and Z2,TF2 be the booking limits for the lower fare product in the first
and second time frame, respectively. The optimal fares of the deterministic model
imply demands of 36 and 21 for Fare Product 2 in TF1 and TF2. Therefore, in ad-
dition to the zi = 60 booking limit on the total TF1 demand, we impose a booking
limit of Z2,TF1 = 36 on the number of accepted Fare Product 2 bookings in the first
time frame, and another booking limit of Z2,TF2 = 21 on the number of accepted Fare
Product 2 bookings in the second time frame. In this case too, we do not regenerate
the underlying demand, in an effort to allow for a more accurate comparison between
scenarios. Only the number of accepted bookings changes.
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Figure 3-11: Impacts of the booking limit on the type of accepted bookings
The results are summarized in Table 3.9. Enforcing the booking limits on Fare
Product 2 in both time frames results in a decrease in the estimated average total
revenues from the case where no booking limit is applied. However, the change is very
small. It is driven by the decrease in the total number of accepted bookings. With
the additional booking limits, the average number of accepted bookings diminished.
More Fare Product 2 booking requests were rejected, however the booking limits were
not well adapted since this did not result in many additional higher-revenue bookings.
3.6.4 Simulations with a traditional revenue management ap-
proach
The last set of simulations is intended to help us compare the deterministic joint
optimization approach with a more traditional revenue management method. To do
so we used a fixed fare structure combined with a leg-based seat allocation method,
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TF2
TF1
Accepted
Bookings
Total
LF(%)
Uniform Distribution
Accepted
Gaussian Distribution
Accepted
Revenue Bookings Revenue Bookings
Simulations without zi $24,856 90 $25,107 91
Simulations with z1  $24,970 88 $25,292 90
Change 0.5% -2 0.7% -1
Simulations with zi,
Z2,TF1 and Z2,TF2 $24,732 87 $25,078 89
Change -0.5% -3 -0.1% -3
Table 3.9: Impacts of booking limits on the expected revenues and the accepted bookings
the Expected Marginal Seat Revenue method, also noted EMSRb. In this traditional
revenue management approach, the fares and booking limit are considered separately.
The fares are not part of the decision process and do not change. It is therefore dif-
ficult to propose a straight-forward comparison.
We use the same parameters as those displayed in Table 3.1 to test this tra-
ditional revenue management method. In this traditional approach, the fares are
assumed to remain fixed throughout the entire selling period and we therefore keep
the fares unchanged. We use the formulation of the deterministic joint pricing and
seat allocation method to determine the pair of fares that would optimize the rev-
enues. This should mitigate the impact of a poor pricing strategy on the simulated
revenues. The optimal fares are $392 and $189. Once the pair of fares is known, it is
possible to apply the leg-based seat allocation method, EMSRb, to find the optimal
booking limit. As show in Figure 3-12, the deterministic demand for Fare Product 1
and Fare Product 2 is 28 and 72, respectively. Standard deviations of 20 and 12 in
TF1 and TF2 imply standard deviations of 10 and 14 for Fare Product 1 and Fare
Product 2, respectively. The EMSRb booking limit for Fare Product 2 is therefore 71.
The total demand for the two fare products is generated for each time frame, given
the new optimal pair of fares. We deduce the demand for each fare product based on
66
TF1
Predicted
Fare Demand
392.4 21
TF2
Predicted
Fare Demand
392.4 8
Total
Average Predicted
Fare Demand
473.0 28
189.0
Fare
Prodtict I
Fare
Product 2
mZ J
Total
32 189.0
53
40
47
189.0 72
100
Figure 3-12: Fares and demands for the traditional revenue management method
the implied probabilities pi and P2. The booking limit of 71 seats is then applied to
the demand for Fare Product 2 and the flight capacity limit is applied to the sum of
the demands for the two products.
Once again, we use two distinct sets of simulations. In the first set of simulations,
the demand is uniformly distributed in both time frames. In a second set of simu-
lations, the demand is normally distributed in both time frames. For both type of
demands, we generate 1,000 samples.
Uniform
Demand
Accepted Bookings:
Traditional RM Approach
Joint Optimization with zi
Change
Revenues:
Traditional RM Approach
Joint Optimization with zi
Change
90.6
88.3
-2.5%
$24,116
$24,970
3.5%
Gaussian
Demand
90.6
89.6
-1.1%
$24,239
$25,292
3.5%
Table 3.10: Comparison between joint optimization and a traditional revenue management approach
The deterministic joint optimization solution provides a 3.5% increase in revenues
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Figure 3-13: Cumulative distribution functions of the revenues, for Gaussian demands
from the traditional approach to revenue management with a single set of fares, as
shown in Table 3.10. The pair of fares used for this set of simulations is already par-
tially optimized: we used the deterministic model to find the best pair of fares given
the flight capacity. In reality, fares are usually not optimal when traditional revenue
management approaches are used and the deterministic model could therefore result
in an even higher increase in revenue.
Figure 3-13 shows the cumulative distribution functions of the revenues when the
demand in Gaussian. The joint optimization approach can help the airline reduce
the risks of lower revenues. The highest revenues are also obtained with the joint
optimization approach.
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3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we formulated the two-product, two-period joint pricing and seat
allocation problem.
We proposed a first approach to solving this problem by first assuming that the
demand is deterministic. This assumption enabled us to gain some insights. In the
deterministic case, the booking limit was unnecessary, which greatly simplified the
objective function.
In the last section, a numerical example was used to illustrate the deterministic
approach and run a few sets of simulations in which the demand exhibits some vari-
ability. The simulations confirmed the benefits of enforcing the booking limit when
the demand is stochastic. By protecting a minimum number of seats from early, low
revenues passengers, the booking limit enabled the airline to improve its expected
revenues. The simulations showed that even when the demand is uncertain, the pro-
posed approach performed well when compared to a traditional approach to revenue
management method. Finally, the proposed approach behaved well under the two
types of demand distribution tested. The uniform and Gaussian distributions led to
very similar results.
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Chapter 4
Stochastic Approach to Joint
Pricing and Seat Allocation
Optimization
In this chapter, we extend the work presented in Chapter 3 by introducing stochastic-
ity in the demand formulation. The total demand for the fare products is no longer
deterministic. While it still depends on the products' prices, it now also encompasses
an uncertainty component. This new formulation, in which the demand fluctuates
around an average, is intended to be more realistic. The objective of the stochastic
model is to simultaneously find the optimal set of fares and booking limit that max-
imize the expected total revenue.
This chapter is divided into five sections. We begin by reviewing the problem
scope. The notations are identical to those used in Chapter 3. In Section 4.2 we state
and explain the assumptions regarding the demand formulation. In the following
section, we derive the objective function by analysing the effect of demand uncertainty
on the total number of accepted bookings, one time frame after the other. The analysis
is based on a geometrical analogy. We then go back to the numerical example from
the previous chapter to illustrate the new stochastic approach to joint pricing and
seat allocation. We compare the results with those obtained with the deterministic
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approach and the more traditional leg-based revenue management method EMSRb.
Finally, we conclude the chapter with a sensitivity analysis and performance analysis.
4.1 Scope of the Problem
The scope of the problem remains the same as in the previous chapter. We place
ourselves in a single carrier, single flight, single OD market environment, and the
flight has a fixed capacity of C seats.
Again, two fare products are offered. They provide exactly the same in-flight ser-
vice but are associated with two distinct sets of purchase restrictions and are priced
differently. Fare Product 1 represents the more expensive, less restricted, product.
The other product, Fare Product 2, is priced lower, but in return, has additional
restrictions and rules. The prices of the two products can change over time.
The booking period is divided into two time frames, noted TF1 and TF2. Book-
ings start to be accepted at the beginning of the first time frame, TF1. The prices
of the two products can be modified at the start of each new time period. The price
points are decision variables.
Furthermore, the airline can limit the total number of seats to be sold in the first
time frame. Any unsold seats at the end of the first time frame is available for book-
ing in the second time frame: the seat inventory is nested.
The notations used in this chapter are the same as the ones used previously.
4.2 Model Assumptions
We make the following assumptions regarding the demand formulation:
1. The demands in the two time frames are independent.
72
2. The total demand for both products in TFi is uncertain, and modelled as a
stochastic additive function ntot,,i = pi (yi) + Ei.
3. The expectation of the total demand in TFi, denoted pi, is a linear function of
the lower price: pi (yi) = ai - #3yj, with aj, 3 > 0.
4. The random variable Ei is uniformly distributed: si - U [-o-, o-].
5. The probability that a passenger chooses the less restricted product is
1
pi (Xi, yj) = + ea-bsy,+cixi, with bi, c > 0.
Assumptions 2 and 4 are the two assumptions that were not applied in the pre-
vious chapter. Through Assumption 2, we introduce the total demand as a random
variable. The mean value of the total demand, given by Assumption 3, corresponds
to the deterministic demand of the previous chapter. Assumption 4 implies that the
total demand in each time frame is uniformly distributed. In the literature on rev-
enue management, the most commonly used probability distribution is the Gaussian
distribution (Weatherford, 1997; Kuyumcu and Garcia Diaz, 2000). However, several
reasons, detailed next, led us to chose the uniform distribution over the Gaussian one.
As we shall see in the following section, determining the expected number of ac-
cepted bookings, also called the censored demand, over the two time frames is critical
to the optimization problem. The probability density function of the sum of two
independent random variables is the convolution product of their individual density
functions. While we know that the convolution of two unbounded Gaussian prob-
ability density functions is a simple Gaussian probability density function, there is
no closed-form expression for the convolution of bounded Gaussian distributions. In
other words, because the booking limit or the flight capacity truncate the probability
distribution function of the demand in the first time frame, the convolution product
becomes extremely complex when the distributions are Gaussians. The uniform dis-
tribution, on the other hand, enables us derive the probability density function of the
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sum of two bounded variables.
Nevertheless, we shall note that all the work done with the uniform distribution
can be used to model the Gaussian distribution. The Gaussian function can be seen
as the limit of a sum of uniform functions, as shown in Figure 4-1, and the convolution
product of two sums of functions is the sum of the convolution products of all pos-
kf k9  kf kg
sible pairs of functions: L fi * = [ (fi * g3). The results found
(i=1 (j=1 i&=1 j=1
for two uniform distributions can be directly applied to every pair of functions fi * gj.
The findings of this chapter can thus be easily extended and used to approximate the
results for Gaussian distributions.
In addition, the uniform distribution does not put as much emphasis on the mean
as the Gaussian distribution does. In reality, it might occur that a demand much
lower or higher than the mean is more likely than the normal distribution predicts.
Modeling the demand with the uniform distribution therefore protects the airline a
bit more against lower revenues.
4.3 Objective Function
The total revenues generated by the sale of the two products over the course of the
two time frames is given by:
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Figure 4-1: Gaussian as the limit of a sum of uniform functions
Rtota = R1 + R2
ntotal,1 [p1xI + (1 - PI) yi]
zi [pixi + (1 - pi) y1],
if nettai,1 < zi;
otherwise.
R2 ntota,2 [P2X2 + (1 - P2)Y2], if ntota,2 < C - min (zi,ntota,1);
[C - min (zi, ntota,,)] [p2 x 2 + (1 - p2) Y2], otherwise.
The two underlying demands ntotai and ntotal,2 are uniformly distributed. The
objective function for the stochastic model is therefore the expected value of the total
revenue:
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with R1 =
total J min (ntotai,1, zi) [pix1 + (1 - pi) y1] fi (ntotae,1) dntotai,1
+ f min (ntotal,2, C - min (ntota,1, zi)) [p2X 2 + (1 - P2) Y2] fi (ntotai,1) f2 (ntotal,2) dntotal,1dntota,2
The expected revenue from the first time frame only depends on few variables.
Once again, we will analyse the revenue functions for the two time frames separately,
starting with the simpler first time frame revenue.
Time Frame 1
In this section, we will drop the index 1 to simplify the notation. The revenue function
is:
R (x, y, z) ={ ntotalPX + ntotal (1 - p) y, if ntotal < z;zpx + z (1 - p) y, otherwise.
The expected revenue in TF1 is given by the following equation:
R (x, y, z) = min (ntotol, z) [px + (1 - p) y] f (notc) dntotca
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For z C [p - o-; p + ] and z < C, we have:
R (x, y, z) = ntotal [px ± (1 - p) y] f (ntotai) dntotal
+ 100 z [px + (1 - p) y] f (ntotai) dntotal
[pX + (1 - p) y] neLo ftotaif (nttoti) dntotai + z f (ntota) dntotoal
=[ox + (1 -p)yi] o"dntota+ - z dntotaj[X+ I. A yf,_0a 2o- J 2a
[X+ 1 AY1z+p (p Z)2 
0
2 4o- 4
We can introduce the expected value of the censored demand, noted rccpte:
pifz > P+ 0;
-z_ z p (p-z)2  o-
naccete 
- -- , Gf ze[p1-o;pL+or];
Z, ifz<p- 0.
The expected revenue in TF1 can then be rewritten as:
R (x, y, z) = [px + (1 - p) Y1iaccpted.
It is important to note the difference between the underlying demand and the
actually observed number of bookings or censored demand.
The underlying demand is the demand that would be observed if the airline could
accept all the booking requests it received. However, in reality, they are physical
constraints that bound the total number of bookings that can be accepted. Once the
flight capacity or the booking limits are reached, the airline has to reject booking re-
quests. Therefore, the total number of accepted bookings, which is the total censored
demand, is in most cases different from and lower than the underlying total demand.
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Figure 4-2: Underlying and constrained, also called censored, demands in TF1
The revenues generated by the sale of the two products depends on the number of
accepted bookings. Therefore, the expected revenues are a function of the expected
censored demand, noted incapted,i. The probability density function of the censored
demand in TF1 depends on the booking limit imposed by the airline, as shown in
Figure 4-2. The expected censored demand is a function of Pi (yi), z and o-. The
expected value of the underlying total demand, pi, and the booking limit zi are lower
and upper bounds of the expected censored total demand.
Time Frame 2
The maximum number of bookings that can be accepted in the second time frame de-
pends on remaining capacity at the end of the first time frame, i.e. C-min (ntoat,1, zi),
as outlined in the following equation:
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R2 ntotal,2 P2x2 + (1 - P2) Y2] , if ntotal,2 < C - min (zi, ntotal,1);
[C- min (zi,ntotat,1)] [p2 x2 + (1 - P2) Y2], otherwise.
The second time frame's revenue function not only depends upon the flight capac-
ity, but also the upon variables form the first time frames. The flight capacity could
have been, for the second time frame, the equivalent of the booking limit from the first
time frame. However, the seat supply for the two time frames is nested: the physical
constraint embodied by the flight capacity does not solely apply to bookings of a
single time frame but to the combined bookings of both time frames. The combined
censored demands of the two time frames have to verify Taccpted,1 + accepted,2 < C.
The first time's booking limit and the flight capacity affect the number of bookings
that can be accepted in the two time frames, as shown in Figure 4-3.
The expected value of the revenues in TF2 is a function of the expected censored
demand in TF2, noted Taccpted,2.
I2 = [P2-T2 + (1 - P2) Y2] Taccteed,2
One way to determine the expected value of the censored TF2 demand would
consist of first evaluating the expected value of the sum of the two censored demands
faccepted,1 + accepted,2, and then subtracting the known accetde,1. This would involve
a cumbersome convolution of a censored and an uncensored probability density func-
tion. There is, however, a more straight-forward and intuitive method to obtain
ffaccepted,2-
Indeed, the expected value of the total censored TF2 demand can be found geo-
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Figure 4-3: Constraints on the bookings in the two time frames
metrically. The probability density functions of the underlying, underlying, demands
in TF1 and TF2 are fairly simple. The region of possible values for niotal,1 and ntotaL,2
can be divided into four smaller regions by the constraints zi and C. Those four
regions are shown in Figure 6-1.
Region I is not affected by either constraint. All the points in this region are
equally likely to be drawn.
In Region II, the bookings in TF1 were lower than the booking limit and are
therefore equally likely to be drawn. They are not affect by either the booking limit
or the capacity constraint. However, the sum of booking requests in TF1 and TF2
are greater than C. The capacity constraint therefore applies to TF2. In this region,
the demand in TF2 is censored to C - ntotal,1.
In the other two regions, Region III and Region IV, the booking limit had to be
enforced in the first time frame. However, the booking limit and capacity constraint
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Figure 4-4: Divide and conquer
are not enforced simultaneously. The booking limit z1 is applied first and will affect
the number of accepted bookings in TF1 only. The capacity constraint is applied
later, but its impact on the number of accepted TF2 bookings depends on the number
of bookings accepted in TF1.
In Region III, the booking limit zi applies to the first time frame's bookings: the
TF1 demand is censored and exactly zi bookings are accepted. The underlying TF2
demand of this third region is between p2 - o,2 and C - zi. Therefore, when the
booking limit is enforced in the first time frame, the sum of bookings for TF1 and
underlying demand for TF2 is lower than the capacity. The TF2 demand is not
capped.
In Region IV, both constraints apply. The booking limit zi was enforced in the
first time frame and the accepted number of bookings in this region is exactly equal
to zi. Then, in the second time frame, the underlying demand is too high again and
the accpeted number of bookings is exactly equal to C - zi. there are more than zi
booking requests in TF1 and more than C - zi requests in TF2.
For each of one these four regions, we can easily find the ordinate of the barycen-
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tre, and therefore deduct -accepted,2-
We assume that the condition Cap - zi < P2 + 92 is always satisfied. In order
words, we assume that the fares are such that the flight capacity can be reached. If
this is not the case, the total demand is much lower than the capacity and there is
little meed for seat allocation optimization. There are three cases to consider, depend-
ing on the position of the flight capacity constraint with respect to the underlying
TF2 demand. We shall first consider the case for which: p1 - i 5 C - p2 - o-2 < z1 .
This is the case depicted by Figure 6-1.
We shall first consider Regions I & II. We shall compare the ordinates of these two
regions in the two following cases: without and with the capacity constraint. When
the flight capacity is not enforced, the ordinate of the combined regions is simply p12-
Let Yi,f' be the ordinate of the barycenter of these two regions when the capacity
constraint is applied. The two regions' characteristics of interest are listed in the two
tables, Table 4.1 and Table 4.2.
Barycenter's
Region Ordinate Area
I unknown 2CF2 (zi -(12 + U2 - Ciz))2
C - z + 2 2 + 2a 2  (/12 + 2 - C + zi)2
3 2
Total p2 2o2 (zi - p1 + ai)
Table 4.1: Underlying demands in Regions I and II
By substitution, we have Y , 1  
=L2 - (-2 +02
1202 (z1 - 1 + i)
Similarly, we can define the ordinates of the Regions III and IV's barycentres, as
shown in Table 4.3. The ordinate of the two regions' barycenter is given by YrnIjv
C - z1 +12 (_ 2 - C + z1) 2  0-2
2 4o 2 4'
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Barycenter's
Region Ordinate Area
I unknown 20-2 (zi - pi + o) - _A____-C+__ 2
2C - 2z1+ pL2 + -2  +_2 C + z1)23 2
Total Yji 2U2 (z1 - pl + 0-1)
Table 4.2: Censored demands in Regions I and II
Barycenter's
Region Ordinate Area
III (C - zi + p2 - o 2 ) (C - ZI - P2 + 0-2 ) ([L + o1 - zi)
IV C - zi (p2+ -2 - C + zi) (p1 + o- - zi)
Total YIIIv 2o-2 (1t + ol - zi)
Table 4.3: Censored demands in Regions III and IV
As, 2 o-17accepted,2 = Yin' (zi - il + 0ol) + Yinr,Iv (pt1 + o1 - zi), we have, for L1 -
U-1 C - p2 - o-2 < zi:
"accepted,2 -
(P2 - + U-2 - C + z1)3
p212o-2 (zi - p1 + a-1)
(z1 - P1 + Oi)
2al
+C - Z I + p 2 (p-2 -C + zi)2 U.2
2 40-2 4 _
pl + o- - Zi
2a
We can use the same geometrical approach to determine the expected censored
demand in the two remaining cases. For [Li - o-l < zi 5 C - [2 - c-2 , we have
Tiaccepted,2 = [12. For C - P2 - 0'2 5 P1 - o- zi, the expected censored demand is
z2 - (pl - 0_1)2
p12 12U-2
±C - zl + 2 _ (pL22
C + zi) 2
4o-2
o- 1 C)2 (Zi - Li + a)
201
L + ol - Zi
2o-1
Figure 4-5 is an illustration of the expected censored demand in TF2 as a function
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of the first time frame's demand and booking limit.
The assumption that the demand follows a uniform distribution allowed us to
determine the exact expression of the censored demand. The geometrical approach
would not have been possible with a Gaussian distribution. Instead, one would have
had to resort to simulations to estimate the number of accepted bookings. The use
of this simple distribution will be particularly useful as we move to a multiple-time
frame optimization problem. As we shall seen in the next chapter, it is possible to
extend the geometrical approach to additional time periods.
Total Expected Revenues
The objective function is the expected total revenues generated by the sale of the two
products over the course of the two time frames:
Rtotal =accepted,1 X1PI + (1 - P1) Y1] + faccepted,2 [X2P2 + (1 P2) Y21
with accepted,1 2 4 i 4 '
and, for p1 - o1 < C - 112 - 0-2 < zi:
(accepted,2 
- P2- I O  - C + z) 3  (zi - P1 + a)
n 122 (Zi - /1-i-i) I 2o-
[C - Zi + 2 (p2 - C + Z)2 T2 p1 + O-1 Zi
for p1i - 01 <_ Z1 < C - p2 - O2: Waccepted,2 = p2;
for C - p12 - O2 1 - O1 <z 1 :
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z - ( - o 1 )2  (A2 + o2 + - o-1 - C)2 (z 1 - 1 ±J + a-)
12+acceted,2 - 2
2  2-1
C - zi + 2  (p 2A-C+zi) 2  0.2 pLI+ 0-1 Zi
2 4u2 4 2a-
2
In this model, we have, by construction, iaccepted,1 < zi and Tacceptedi 5 C.
i=1
The two booking constraints zi and C are included in the objective function.
The objective function is a non-linear, neither concave nor convex function. A
non-linear maximization technique, such as the Powell's algorithm can be used to
determine the optimal set of fares and booking limit. The deterministic optimal
solution, derived from the deterministic problem, can be used as a starting point.
4.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we illustrate the stochastic joint pricing and seat allocation approach
with a numerical example. This example will help us understand the advantages
of the stochastic model over the deterministic one. Furthermore, simulations drawn
from this example will enable us to test the model under different assumptions and
compare the joint approach to a more traditional revenue management approach.
The assumed parameters for the demands in the two time frames considered are
given in Table 4.4. The demand and portion parameters are identical to the parame-
ters used in Chapter 3. However, for the stochastic approach, we have two additional
parameters which describe the standard deviation associated to the total demand
in each time frame: si and s2. The relationship between the uniform distribution's
standard deviation s and distance between upper bound and mean, noted - in the
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problem formulation, is given by o-= sv/5. The flight capacity is 100 seats.
TF1 TF2
a 1 =135 a2 8Total Demand nittalt a3 0.445 /2 0.20
' P# = 0.44 #2-=0.20
ai = 0.864 a2 = -0.038
Probability pt b1 = -0.020 b2  -0.016
ci = 0.009 c2  0.008
Standard deviation s= 20 S2=12
Table 4.4: Parameters for the demand functions
The optimal stochastic solution to this joint pricing and seat allocation problem
is obtained with Matlab. The maximum total revenue is reached with the fares and
booking limit of Table 4.5. The stochastic optimal fares are higher than the deter-
ministic fares, and the increase is larger in the first time frame. These higher fares
should lower the demand, yet the optimal booking limit is also higher than the im-
plied deterministic booking limit.
Fare Product 1
Fare Product 2
Booking limit
TF1
x* = $383.4
y* = $196.5
z* = 73
Table 4.5: Stochastic optimal solution to the joint pricing and seat allocation problem
Based on the assumed input parameters, we deduce the total number of accepted
bookings, or censored demand, and revenues implied by these fares and booking limit,
as shown in Table 4.6. The optimal fares and booking limit determined with the
stochastic approach result in a total expected censored demand of 82.6, or an average
load factor of 82.6%. The expected total revenue is $25.7k. This forecasted expected
revenue is about 9% lower than the $28.1k revenue predicted with the deterministic
model. However, the previous chapter's simulations revealed that, in practice, the
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Figure 4-6: Difference between the two time frames' underlying and censored demand
average revenue generated by the deterministic optimal solution in a stochastic envi-
ronment only averages $25.0k.
TF1 TF2 Total
Average fare ($) 279.8 355.8
Underlying Demand * =49.5 , =37.6 p =87.1
Accepted Bookings Wtaj =48.7 7total,2 =33.9 7ta =82.6
Revenues (k$) R = 13.6 R2 = 12.1 Rot = 25.7
Table 4.6: Implied censored demand and revenues
Figure 4-6 shows the underlying and censored demands for the two models, de-
terministic and stochastic. In the case of the deterministic model, the underlying
demand corresponding to the optimal solution matches the flight capacity exactly.
The simulations revealed that the demand variability, the booking limit and the
flight capacity all constrain the demand to about 88 instead. The stochastic model,
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Figure 4-7: Impact of fares and booking limit on the revenues
which takes into account uncertainty and constraints, recommends fares which lower
the total underlying demand altogether. The displacement between underlying and
censored demands is reduced. As shown in Figure 4-6, the censored demand obtained
with the stochastic solution should not be too far off the actual total number of
bookings observed with the deterministic solution in practice. Yet, since the fares are
optimized in light of the constraints and their impact on the observed demand, the
average revenues provided by the stochastic model should ultimately be higher.
Figure 4-7 is a schematic overview of the relationship between the problem's in-
puts, the fares and booking limit, in green in the graph, the different types of demands,
in blue, and the revenue. Fares stimulate the underlying demand, and their effects
therefore cascade down to the censored demand as well. The booking limit and the
flight capacity constrain the underlying demand. The amplitude of a constraint's
impact on the underlying demand can be seen as inversely proportional to their dis-
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tance. This impact, labelled as "demand displacement" in Figure 4-7, is subtracted
from the underlying demand, yielding the censored demand. Eventually, the fares
intervene again directly, since the revenues is the product of the censored demand
and an average fare.
Increasing the fares lowers the underlying demand, which lowers the impact of the
flight capacity. The censored demand thus undergoes minimal changes. However, be-
cause the fares, the other revenue component, are higher, the total revenues increase.
The booking limit and fares, adjusted simultaneously, can increase the expected total
revenues of the airline overtime.
4.5 Simulations
We shall now run several sets of simulations in which the demand is stochastic and
analyse the results of the stochastic model.
4.5.1 Simulations with the stochastic optimal set of fares and
booking limit
In the first set of simulations, we use the fares and booking limit corresponding to
the stochastic optimal solution (see Table 4.5). The booking limits do not affect the
probability that a passenger chooses the higher fare product.
As was the case in Chapter 3, the total demand for the two fare products is gener-
ated at the beginning of each time period. We run two distinct types of simulations.
In the first type of simulations, the demand is uniformly distributed in both time
frames. In a second type of simulations, the demand is normally distributed in both
time frames. The demands for the two time frames are independent. For both type
of demands, we generate 1,000 samples. We use the parameters displayed in Table
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4.4, to model the expected demands. The standard deviations of the demands in
TF1 and TF2 are 20 and 12, respectively, as outlined in Table 4.4. For the normal
distribution, the demand is truncated in order to prevent any instance of negative
demand. Finally, the flight capacity does not affect the probability that a passenger
chooses the higher fare product.
These simulations should, in a first time, enable us to ascertain the accuracy of
the predicted revenues. The simulations will also help us compare the performance
of the stochastic model when the demand is not uniformly distributed but normally
distributed.
Table 4.7 summarizes the findings. The simulations results match the values pre-
dicted by the stochastic model in the uniform distribution case. The results are higher
than expected when the demand is normally distributed.
Uniform Gaussian
Demand Demand
TF1 Accepted Bookings 48.5 48.1
TF2 Accepted Bookings 34.2 35.0
Load factor 82.8% 83.1%
Diff. w/ Deterministic -5.5 -6.5
Total Revenues (k$) 25.8 25.9
Rel. Diff. w/ Deterministic 2.5% 2.5%
Table 4.7: Average censored demands and revenues
The estimated expected censored demands are very close to the predicted censored
demands for both demand distribution types. In the case of the uniform distribution,
the relative difference between the simulated censored demand and the predicted ex-
pected censored demand is -0.3% and 1.2% for TF1 and TF2, respectively.
The stochastic model is based on the uniform distribution and the relative dif-
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ferences between the theoretical and simulated results with a Gaussian distribution
are therefore slightly larger for the Gaussian distribution. We should note that the
estimated average demands are higher for the Gaussian distribution. The Gaussian
distribution gives more weight to the mean of the underlying demand. Thus, the
expected censored demand for this distribution type lies between the uniform distri-
butions' anccepted and p. We can use the nicc computed for the uniform distribution
as a lower bound for the expected censored demand in the case of a Gaussian distri-
bution.
For the uniform demand distribution, the average total revenue is only 0.4% higher
than the predicted revenue. For the Gaussian distribution, the expected revenues are
1.0% higher than predicted, due to the higher average censored demand.
The set of fares and booking limit determined with the stochastic model led to
2.5% increase in revenues from the deterministic model. The average load factor is
however 5-6 points lower than it used to be with the deterministic solution.
Figure 4-8 shows the histogram of the revenues for the deterministic and stochastic
model when the demand is uniformly distributed. The revenues obtained with the
stochastic optimal solution span over a larger range of values. The minimum revenue
observed with the stochastic solution is $11.0k instead of $13.8k for the deterministic
fares and booking limit. However, revenues are higher than $28.5k in 43% of the
cases with the stochastic approach, versus 7% only in the case of the deterministic
approach. The stochastic model can provide a 2.5% increase in revenues on average.
4.5.2 Simulations with re-optimized TF2 fares
While the stochastic optimal solution provides a 2.5% increase in revenues, it also
lowers the load factor by about 7 points. By modifying the TF2 fares at the end of
the first time frame, given the observed TF1 demand, we may be able to adjust the
demand to better match the remaining capacity.
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Figure 4-8: Revenue histogram for the uniform demand distribution
Previously, a very low underlying TF1 demand would leave much more seats avail-
able for the second time frame than anticipated. Yet, the TF2 fares, optimal for the
average demand, are ill-suited to accommodate the "extra" capacity. As we re-adjust
the TF2 at the end of the second time frame, we can lower the optimal x2 and y2 to
foster the demand and fill-in the remaining capacity, while maintaining the revenues
to an even level. This should help us improve the load factor without sacrificing the
revenues.
In this second test, we allow for the re-optimization of the fares at the end of
the first time frame. At the end of TF1, the remaining capacity is computed as
C - min (nt,1, zi). The stochastic approach can then be applied to the second time
frame only, with the flight capacity set equal to the remaining capacity. The newly
determined set of optimal fares for TF2 is then used to generate the demand. We
keep the same generated demand for the first time frame, in order to compare this
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set of simulations with the previous "static" one.
Uniform
Demand
TF2 average fare:
Static
Re-optimized
TF2 average accepted bookings:
Static
Re-optimized
Average load factor:
Static
Re-optimized
Changes in LF
Average total revenues:
Static
Re-optimized
Change in revenues
$355.8
$335.7
34.3
36.5
82.8%
85.0%
2.1
$25.8k
$25.8k
0.1%
Gaussian
Demand
$355.8
$337.1
35.0
37.0
83.1%
85.1%
2.0
$25.9k
$25.9k
0.0%
Table 4.8: Impacts of the re-optimization on the expected revenues
For both types of demand distribution, the adjustment of the TF2 fares at the end
of the first time frame results in very little changes in the revenues but improves the
load factor, as shown in Table 4.8. The average re-optimised TF2 fare is about $20
lower than initial optimal average of $355.8, fostering the demand. The TF2 censored
demand is about 2 points higher. This resulted in an increased load factor, averaging
85%. As anticipated, the decrease in average fare combined to the increase in the
number of accepted bookings ultimately lead to very small changes in the revenues:
+0.1% for the uniform distribution and 0.0% change for the Gaussian distribution.
As shown in Figure 4-9, the probability of revenues higher than $30.Ok greatly
increases when the TF2 fares are re-optimized at the end of the first time period.
Re-optimizing the fares lowers the risk of low revenues.
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Figure 4-9: Revenue histogram for the uniform distribution when TF2 fares are adjusted
4.5.3 Simulations with booking limits on Fare Product 2
The stochastic model we developed includes a single booking limit. This booking
limit protect seats for the later time frames versus the earlier one, rather than for a
higher fare product versus a lower fare product. In practice, airlines would impose a
booking limit on the lower fare product as well, as discussed in the previous chapter.
We will take advantage of our numerical example to test this other type of booking
limits on our model.
Let Z2,TF1 and Z2,TF2 be the booking limits for the lower fare product in the
first and second time frame, respectively. These limits are not part of the stochastic
model's output. We shall therefore test several levels for each one of them. The tested
values for z2,TF1 are between a slightly lower value than the underlying expected Fare
Product 2 demand in TF1, given the optimal TF1 fare y*, and the maximum demand
for Fare Product 2 in TF1, which is defined by optimal TF1 booking limit z*. For
the second time frame, we test values between 17, which is slightly lower than the
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expected underlying demand for Fare Product 2 in TF2 and 45. In this case too, we
do not regenerate the underlying demand in neither time frames, in an effort to allow
for a more accurate comparison between scenarios.
The results are summarized in Table 4.9 and represented on Figure 4-10. The
additional booking limits led to a -3.5% to +0.02% change in revenues. Very low TF2
booking limits on Fare Product 2 systematically result in a decrease in revenues. The
lower Z2,TF2, the larger the decrease. Larger values of this same booking limit do not,
however, affect the revenues. The change in revenues seems to be mostly driven by
Z2,TF1-
For Z2,TF1= 31, which is about 15% higher than the expected number of booking
requests for Fare Product 2 in the first time frame, we observe a slight increase in
revenues (+0.02%) when Z2,TF2 is large enough. All other combinations of booking
limits led to a decrease in revenues.
Several factors may account for these results. Our optimization model does not
include booking limits on Fare Product 2. Therefore, enforcing such booking limits
with the stochastic optimal set of fares and Z4 is unlikely to be optimal and provide a
very large increase in revenues in our simulations. Additionally, the objective of limits
on lower fare products is to protect seats for passengers with a higher willingness-
to-pay who usually arrive late in the booking process. The time dimension of this
strategy is already taken into account in our model. By dividing the selling period
into two time frames and imposing a booking limit on the first time frame, we ensure
that seats are saved for the late, high-revenue passengers of TF2.
The fares, which are now decision variables, also enable us to control the demands
for the two fare products in each time frame. These demands are assumed to be
dependent on the two products' fares and the stochastic model's output therefore im-
plicitly optimizes the mix of Fare Product 1 and 2 passengers. The potential revenue
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impact of additional booking limits on Fare Product 2 is lessen.
Furthermore, our model does not make any assumptions on the arrival order of
Fare Product 1 and 2 passengers within each time frame. Contrary to Weatherford
(1997) for example, we do not assume that all lower-revenue passengers arrive first
and higher-revenue passengers last. In this type of unrealistic scenario, enforcing a
booking limit on Fare Product 2 bookings would probably lead to large increase in
revenues.
Lastly, in our model, the probability that a passengers buys the higher fare prod-
uct is deterministic. A booking limit of Fare Product 2 may lead to a larger increase
in revenue if we had large variations in the passenger mix.
Z2,TF2
17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45
41 -2.7 -1.8 -1.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
37 -2.4 -1.5 -1.0 -0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
34 -1.6 -1.3 -0.8 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
z2,TF1 31 -1.5 -1.1 -0.8 -0.6 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0
27 -2.3 -1.3 -0.9 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
24 -3.5 -1.8 -1.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
Table 4.9: Changes in revenues due to the implementation of Fare Product2's booking limits
4.5.4 Simulations with a traditional revenue management ap-
proach
This set of simulations is intended to help us compare the stochastic joint optimiza-
tion model with a traditional revenue management approach. To do so we used, as
we did in Chapter 3, a fixed fare structure combined with a leg-based seat allocation
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Figure 4-10: Decrease in revenues due to the implementation of Fare Product2's booking limits
method, the Expected Marginal Seat Revenue method, also noted EMSRb. For the
joint approach, we do not re-adjust the TF2 fares.
We use the same parameters as those displayed in Table 4.4 . In the traditional
approach, the fares are assumed to remain fixed throughout the entire selling period.
We use the stochastic joint optimization approach to find the optimal pair of fares
for EMSRb. In this formulation, the booking limit of the first time frame is equal to
the flight capacity. The optimal pair of fares for TF1 and TF2 is : $428 and $211.
As shown in Figure 4-11, the predicted censored demand for Fare Product 1 and
Fare Product 2, given the fares, is 24 and 62, respectively. The associated standard
deviations are 11 and 13. The implied EMSRb booking limit for Fare Product 2 is 76.
The total demand for the two fare products is generated for each time frame,
given the optimal pair of fares. We deduce the demand for each fare product based
on the implied probabilities pi and P2. The booking limit of 76 seats is then applied
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Predicted
Constrained
Fare Demand
428 18
211 25
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TF2
Predicted
Constrained
Fare Demand
428 6
Total
Predicted
Average Constrained
Fare Demand
428 24
211 37 211 62
43 86
Figure 4-11: Fares and demands for the traditional revenue management method
to demand for Fare Product 2 and the flight capacity limit is applied to the sum of
the demands for the two products.
Once again, we use two distinct sets of simulations. In the first set of simulations,
the demand is uniformly distributed in both time frames. In a second set of simu-
lations, the demand is normally distributed in both time frames. For both type of
demands, we generate 1,000 samples.
Uniform
Demand
Accepted Bookings:
Traditional RM Approach
Stochastic Joint Optimization
Difference
Revenues:
Traditional RM Approach
Stochastic Joint Optimization
Difference
82.0
82.8
1.0%
$24.9k
$25.8k
3.4%
Gaussian
Demand
82.0
83.1
1.4%
$25.Ok
$25.9k
3.9%
Table 4.10: Comparison between stochastic joint optimization and a traditional revenue management
approach
The comparison is summarised in Table 4.10. The two methods lead to similar
load factors. The load factor for the joint approach is only one point higher than
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Figure 4-12: Cumulative distribution functions of the revenues, for Gaussian demands
the traditional revenue management method's load factor. However, even with the
Gaussian distribution, which is the assumed distribution for the calculations in EM-
SRb, the stochastic joint optimization approach provides a 3.9% increase in revenues.
Figure 4-12 shows the cumulative distribution functions of the revenues when the
demand in Gaussian.
The joint optimization approach can help the airline reduce the risks of lower
revenues. The best revenues are also obtained with the joint optimization approach.
4.6 Sensitivity to Forecasting Errors
There are three sets of input parameters to the stochastic joint optimization model:
the total demand parameters, the probability parameters, and the demand uncer-
tainty. Different estimates of these parameters will change the output of the model,
the optimal set of fares and booking limit. In this section, we build on the previous
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numerical example to discuss the impact of the input parameters on the output of
the stochastic model. We then run simulations in which the demand generated fol-
lows the original, true, input values, as displayed in Table 4.4, but where the fares
and booking limits are the newly found stochastic outputs. This allows us assess the
impact of forecasting errors on the final revenues.
For each cases of forecasting error, we then find the optimal solutions correspond-
ing to the deterministic model and the fixed fare structure,traditional leg-based rev-
enue management method. Simulations are then run again to determine the average
revenues obtained with these new sets of fares and booking limit, allowing a compar-
ison with the stochastic model.
Estimates of the Standard Deviations
The true parameters for the demand and the probability that a passenger chooses
Fare Product 2 are unchanged and are outlined in Table 4.4. The true standard
deviations remain the same: s1 = 20 and S2 = 12.
For the purpose of this discussion, we first assume that the true value of the de-
mand uncertainty is unknown and assume different values. Based on the assumed
si and s2, we use the stochastic model to determine the optimal set of fares and
booking limits. This allows us to appreciate how a change in the uncertainty affects
the model's output. Furthermore, we run simulations in which the demand gener-
ated follows the true parameters but the fares and booking limit imposed are those
corresponding to the assumed demand uncertainty. In order words, the generated
demand has a standard deviation of si = 20 and 82 = 12, but the assumed standard
deviations used to determine the optimal solution are different.
First, we assume different levels of uncertainty in the first time frame, keeping s2
unchanged. We then change the level of uncertainty in the second time frame, keeping
si to its true value of 20. The different values tested, as well as the corresponding
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optimal set of fares and booking limits are shown in Table 4.11 and Table 4.12. The
two figures, Figure 4-13 and Figure 4-14, give a graphical overview of the impact of
the change in uncertainty on the five output components. A small difference in si only
leads to, at most, a $3 variation in the optimal fares, and barely affects the booking
limit. However, if the uncertainty is largely underestimated, and halved for exam-
ple, the variation in the optimal fares increases, and the suggested booking limit is
much lower. The impact on the fares of the two time frames have a similar amplitude.
As the demand uncertainty increases in the second time frame, the first time
frame's fares increase steadily, while the second time frame's fares decrease. As the
uncertainty in TF2 increases, the stochastic model warrants lower fares to ensure the
TF2 demand is high enough in the worst case scenario. Simultaneously, to improve
the expected revenue overall, the model suggests a higher booking limit for the first
time frame.
Assumed Assumed Difference in
si s2 X* y* z* x* y; Revenue (%)
a/ 10 12 378 193 69 481 236 -1.28
b/ 15 12 381 195 73 482 236 -0.54
c/ 18 12 383 196 73 482 236 -1.32
d/ 23 12 384 197 73 483 237 -1.35
e/ 25 12 384 197 73 484 238 -2.45
f/ 30 12 384 196 73 485 239 -0.15
Table 4.11: Sensitivity analysis to uncertainty in the first time frame
The optimal set of fares and booking limit deduced with the assumed standard
deviations are used to run simulations. The generated demand, however, follows the
true parameters. For each combination of standard deviations, 1,000 samples were
used to find the average revenue. The results were compared to the average revenue
obtained when the inputs used for the stochastic model are the true parameters. The
relative differences in revenues are summarized in Table 4.11 and Table 4.12. An
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inadequate estimate of the demand uncertainty led to 0.1 to 2.0% decrease in rev-
enues. As shown in Figure 4-15, a large difference between the true and assumed
TF2 standard deviations led to the larger decrease in revenues.
Assumed Assumed Difference in
si s2 x y* z* x y Revenue (%)
a/ 20 4 375 191 66 488 241 -1.05
b/ 20 7 378 193 69 486 239 -1.22
c/ 20 10 381 195 71 484 238 -2.15
d/ 20 14 385 198 75 482 236 -0.83
e/ 20 17 387 199 78 480 237 -0.53
f/ 20 20 389 200 82 478 234 -1.10
Table 4.12: Sensitivity analysis to uncertainty in the second time frame
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Estimates of the Demand and Probability Parameters
We now assume that we know the true value of the standard deviations, but ignore
the exact value of the other input parameters, one at a time. Based on guesses of
a, #, a, b or c, we use the stochastic model to determine the optimal set of fares
and booking limits. This should allows us to assess how critical forecasting is to the
model's output. Furthermore, we run simulations in which the demand generated
follows the true parameters but the fares and booking limit imposed are those corre-
sponding to the assumed demand uncertainty. The resulting revenue is compared to
the average revenue obtained when the inputs used for the stochastic model are the
true parameters.
The relative differences in revenues are summarized in Table 4.13 and Table 4.14.
A 10% error in the estimate of the one of the two time frames' demand parameter can
lead to a 1.4 to 3.8% decrease in revenues. Over-estimating the parameter a seems
to have the largest detrimental effect on the revenues. The fares are too high for the
actual underlying demand.
An inadequate estimate of the probability function seems to have a smaller impact
on the revenues. As shown in Table 4.14, the decrease in revenue varies between 0.4
and 2.2%.
Comparison with the deterministic model and the more tra-
ditional approach to revenue management method
We now compare the impact of forecasting errors on the revenues obtained with the
stochastic solution, and ,on the one hand, the deterministic solution and, on the other
hand, a traditional revenue management approach. For these simulations too, the de-
mand generated follows the true parameters. The numerical results are summarized
in Tables 4.15, 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18.
105
Relative Diff. Diff. in
with True Revenue
Parameter Value x* y* z x (%)
+10% 149 418 220 78 488 241 -2.7
a1  -10% 122 350 174 69 477 233 -1.5
+10% 94 389 200 68 524 264 -3.8
ae2  -10% 77 377 192 79 442 209 -1.4
+10% 0.48 358 179 70 482 236 -1.9
-10% 0.39 415 218 77 484 238 -2.0
+10% 0.22 382 195 76 450 215 -1.4
132 -10% 0.18 385 198 70 523 264 -2.0
Table 4.13: Sensitivity analysis to the demand input parameters
The expected revenues from the deterministic solution or traditional revenue man-
agement approach's solution are systematically lower than the stochastic solution. As
shown in Tables 4.15 and 4.16, the stochastic model provides at least a 1.5% increase
in revenues from the other two approaches when the uncertainty input parameter is
off.
4.7 Performance Analysis
In this section, we extend the numerical study to analyze the performance of the
stochastic model under different levels of demand and flight capacity. For each one
of the input variables, two new levels are tested, as shown in Table 4.19. The inputs
are changed one at a time.
For each combination of input variables, we determine the optimal set of fares
and booking limit for the deterministic model, the stochastic model and the more
traditional revenue management approach. We then run numerical simulations to
determine the average revenue for each case considered, given the new demand, flight
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Relative Diff. Diff. in
with True Revenue
Parameter Value x* y* z* x* y (%)
+10% 0.950 380 197 73 482 237 -1.3
a, -10% 0.778 387 196 74 483 237 
-2.2
+10% -0.042 383 197 73 483 237 -0.4
a 2  -10% -0.034 383 197 73 483 237 -0.5
+10% 0.022 409 198 76 483 237 -1.3
b, -10% 0.018 368 196 72 483 237 -0.8
+10% 0.018 384 197 71 512 239 -0.3
-10% 0.014 383 196 75 458 235 -1.6
+10% 0.010 365 196 72 483 237 -2.1
C1  -10% 0.008 422 197 76 483 237 -0.6
+10% 0.009 382 196 75 445 236 -1.2
C2  -10% 0.007 384 197 71 520 238 -1.8
Table 4.14: Sensitivity analysis to the probability input parameters
capacity and deduced set of optimal fares and booking limit.
The stochastic approach to joint pricing and seat allocation performs consistently
well, regardless of the input parameters.
Table 4.20 shows the percentage difference in average revenue between the stochas-
tic model and the deterministic model for each one of the 27 input combinations of
demand uncertainty and flight capacity. The stochastic model provides a 0.3 to 6.0%
increase in revenue.
Table 4.21 summarizes the percentage difference in average revenue between the
stochastic model and the traditional approach to revenue management, with a fixed
fares tructure and the EMSRb seat allocation method. The stochastic joint opti-
mization consistently outperforms the traditional approach by providing a 0.3 to
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Di.ff in revenues (%) from
Assumed deterministic traditional RM
s1  s2  solution solution
a/ 10 12 2.93 3.18
b/ 15 12 3.70 3.98
c/ 18 12 2.89 1.38
d/ 23 12 2.85 1.91
e/ 25 12 1.71 1.45
f/ 30 12 4.11 3.91
Table 4.15: Revenue comparison
Assumed
s1 S2
with a forecasting error in the first time's standard deviation
Di.ff in revenues (%) from
deterministic traditional RM
solution solution
a/ 20 4 3.17 7.18
b/ 20 7 2.99 3.38
c/ 20 10 2.02 2.54
d/ 20 14 3.39 2.40
e/ 20 17 3.71 4.83
f/ 20 20 3.11 3.24
Table 4.16: Revenue comparison with a forecasting error in the second time's standard deviation
7.0% increase in revenue.
As the demand parameters and the flight capacity change, the expected revenues
from the deterministic solution or traditional revenue management approach's solu-
tion are systematically lower than the stochastic solution. The numerical results are
summarized in Tables 4.22 to 4.25.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a stochastic approach to solving the joint pricing and
seat allocation optimization problem. The demand is assumed to be a uniformly dis-
108
Relative Diff. Diff. in revenues (%) from
with True deterministic traditional RM
Parameter Value solution solution
+10% 149 0.3 2.1
a1  -10% 122 7.9 4.8
+10% 94 0.5 0.8
e2  -10% 77 5.6 3.1
+10% 0.48 4.5 3.5
)31 -10% 0.39 0.1 2.4
+10% 0.22 4.0 3.1
/32 -10% 0.18 2.5 3.9
Table 4.17: Revenue comparison with a forecasting error in the demand parameter
tributed random variable. Its mean remains a linear function of the lower fare. We
use a geometrical analogy to determined the censored demand of each time frame and
express the new objective revenue function. The stochastic approach relies on both
the fares and the booking limit to maximize the total revenues generated by the two
fare products over the two time periods considered.
The same numerical example as the one of Chapter 3 is used to illustrate this
stochastic approach and run a few sets of simulations. The simulations confirmed
the benefits of accounting for the demand uncertainty and the constraints imposed
on the demand in the problem formulation. The simulations showed that the pro-
posed approach performs well when compared to a traditional revenue management
approach, with fixed fares and a leg-based seat allocation method. Finally, the pro-
posed approach behaved well under the two types of demand distribution tested. The
uniform and Gaussian distributions led to fairly similar results.
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Relative Diff. Diff. in revenues (%) from
with True deterministic traditional RM
Parameter Value solution solution
+10% 0.950 1.4 1.5
ai -10% 0.778 2.4 2.0
+10% -0.042 2.9 3.2
a2  -10% -0.034 3.5 4.2
+10% 0.022 4.3 2.7
b1 -10% 0.018 2.3 2.1
+10% 0.018 3.7 4.7
b2 -10% 0.014 2.5 3.4
+10% 0.010 2.1 1.1
c1 -10% 0.008 4.1 3.8
+10% 0.009 2.5 3.5
C2  -10% 0.007 1.9 2.2
Table 4.18: Revenue comparison with a forecasting error in the probability parameter
Capacity C 90 100 110
a- 10 20 30
U 2  7 12 17
a -10% +10%
# -10% +10%
a2  -10% +10%
b -10% +10%
Cj -10% +10%
Table 4.19: Levels of demand and flight capacity
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Capacity
o- o-2 90 100 110
10 7 0.8 2.1 3.3
10 12 2.1 2.9 3.8
10 17 2.0 3.5 5.8
20 7 0.7 0.8 4.5
20 12 2.1 3.5 3.2
20 17 2.4 3.9 5.6
30 7 0.3 2.5 4.1
30 12 1.3 1.9 5.2
30 17 3.6 3.2 6.1
Table 4.20: Increase in revenue between
stochastic and deterministic joint opti-
mization (%)
Capacity
TF1 TF2 90 100 110
148.5 85.0 2.2 2.7 3.2
121.5 85.0 1.4 3.5 4.7
135.0 93.5 2.0 1.7 2.7
135.0 76.5 3.5 3.3 5.1
0.479 0.200 2.5 3.8 4.9
0.392 0.200 0.9 2.4 4.8
0.435 0.220 10.4 3.6 5.8
0.435 0.180 0.6 2.9 4.6
Table 4.22: Increase in revenue between
stochastic and deterministic joint opti-
mization (%)
Capacity
0-1 0-2 90 100 110
10 7 2.5 3.0 2.5
10 12 3.5 2.1 2.4
10 17 1.8 4.1 2.9
20 7 3.1 2.5 3.9
20 12 4.5 3.3 0.3
20 17 4.0 3.1 3.2
30 7 6.5 5.7 2.7
30 12 5.9 2.6 3.9
30 17 7.0 4.7 4.6
Table 4.21: Increase in revenue between
stochastic joint optimization and the tra-
ditional revenue management approach
(%)
Capacity
TF1 TF2 90 100 110
148.5 85.0 4.2 2.6 1.4
121.5 85.0 5.4 5.0 5.4
135.0 93.5 6.2 3.8 3.8
135.0 76.5 3.3 0.7 0.9
0.479 0.200 6.0 3.4 4.8
0.392 0.200 1.7 2.2 0.7
0.435 0.220 10.9 1.1 1.6
0.435 0.180 4.6 4.8 5.3
Table 4.23: Increase in revenue between
stochastic joint optimization and the tra-
ditional revenue management approach
(%)
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Capacity
TF1 TF2 90 100 110
0.950 -0.038 2.5 4.2 4.3
0.778 -0.038 1.5 3.2 5.6
ai 0.864 -0.042 0.6 2.0 3.7
0.864 -0.034 2.4 2.2 4.7
0.022 0.016 3.0 6.7 1.0
0.018 0.016 2.6 2.9 6.6
bi 0.020 0.018 1.2 4.0 0.7
0.020 0.014 3.9 2.8 2.8
0.010 0.008 1.0 2.1 4.7
0.008 0.008 2.7 4.1 4.4
C 0.009 0.009 1.2 2.5 5.1
0.009 0.007 2.5 2.6 4.9
Table 4.24: Increase in revenue between
stochastic and deterministic joint opti-
mization (%)
Capacity
TF1 TF2 90 100 110
0.950 -0.038 4.2 4.3 2.0
0.778 -0.038 2.4 2.5 4.6
a2  0.864 -0.042 3.1 2.7 1.1
0.864 -0.034 6.5 2.7 1.6
0.022 0.016 5.4 4.6 1.7
0.018 0.016 3.6 3.7 17.0
b 0.020 0.018 3.4 5.3 0.1
0.020 0.014 3.2 2.5 1.4
0.010 0.008 3.0 3.6 3.6
0.008 0.008 6.4 5.6 3.0
ci 0.009 0.009 4.8 4.1 2.8
0.009 0.007 4.4 4.1 2.5
Table 4.25: Increase in revenue between
stochastic joint optimization and the tra-
ditional revenue management approach
(%)
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Chapter 5
Heuristics for the multiple-period
problem
The proposed stochastic model for the two-product, two-time frame joint pricing and
seat allocation optimization problem provides a significant increase in revenue from
the deterministic model or the tested traditional revenue management method given
a traditional, yet optimized, fare structure. The natural next step to improve the
model consists in extending it to additional time frames. Dividing the selling horizon
into more but smaller time frames would allow an increased number of changes in
the fares, which should, to a certain point, help match more closely the changing
characteristics of the passengers over the booking process. Ultimately, solving for the
multiple-time frame optimization problem should further enhance the revenues.
Extending the deterministic model to additional time frames does not present any
problem. The stochastic model, however, will not scale up as easily. With each time
frame, we add not only another uncertainty parameter and but also three decision
variables. Furthermore, as seen in the previous chapter, the censored demand of a
time frame is dependent on the demand that materialized in the previous time frame.
As we increase the number of time intervals, the demands become very quickly more
intricate.
113
In this chapter, we describe how the stochastic model can be extended to addi-
tional time frames. In the first section, we go over the assumptions and introduce
new notations. We then present a recursive approach to determine each time frame's
censored demand. As shown in an example, the problem complexity increases very
rapidly and we therefore propose alternative heuristics to overcome the curse of di-
mension in Section 5.3. Then, we use a numerical example to illustrate the heuristics
and compare their performance with the stochastic and deterministic models.
5.1 Notations and assumptions
The scope of the problem remains the same as in the previous chapter, with a single
carrier, a single flight, a single OD market environment, and a fixed capacity of C
seats.
Again, two fare products are offered, Fare Product 1 and Fare Product 2. The
prices of the two products can change at the start of each of the k time frames con-
stituting the booking period.
The airline can limit the total number of seats to be sold by the end of each time
frame. All the unsold seats are available for booking in the later time frames.
The notations and assumptions of this chapter are similar to the ones used previ-
ously.
* x is the price of Fare Product 1 in TFi
* yj is the price of Fare Product 2 in TFi. We impose that for all i, y < xi.
" zi is the booking limit corresponding to TFi. We havezk = C.
* nittai is the combined underlying demand for Fare Product 1 and 2 in TFi,
and ntotal,i = p- (yi) + ej.
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* The expectation of the total demand in TFi, denoted pi, is a linear function of
the lower price: pi (yi) = ai - 3yj, with c, #i ;> 0.
" The random variable Ei is uniformly distributed: Esj U [-otr, o-i].
" The minimum and maximum values that the underlying demand netoal,i can take
are noted Imin,j and pmax,-
e nccepted,i is the total number of accepted bookings in TFi, also called the cen-
sored demand, when all booking limits are enforced. For example, nccepted,2 =
min [z2 - min (zi, ntota,1) , ntota,2]. Furthermore, we define necceted,o as the null
function.
* Titccpted,i is the average total censored demand for both products in TFi, when
all booking limits are enforced.
* ft is the probability density function of the sum of the censored demands
t
S Wtotaj of TF1 to TFi.
j=1
" ui is the probability density function of the total underlying demand in TFi.
" pi is the probability that a random passenger chooses Fare Product 1 in TFi.
* R, is the total revenues generated by the combined sale of the two fare products
in TFi. Ri represent the expected revenues.
" Rots is the total revenues generated by the sale of the two fare products over
the entire booking period. 77ta is the total expected revenues.
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5.2 Expected total revenues and the expected cen-
sored demands
Expected total revenues
The objective function is the expected value of the total revenues generated by the
sale of the two products over the course of the k time frames considered. The total
revenue function is given by:
k
i=1
with, Vi E [1, ... , k],
ntotal,i [pixi + (1 - pi) yi] , if ntota,i < zi - naccepte,t;
R3 = t=i
(zi - naccepted,i_1) [PijXi ± (1 - pi) yJ], otherwise.
The expected total revenue function for two time frames can be generalized to k
time frames:
k
Rtotal = Wcxccepted,i [XiPi + (1 - pi) yi]
The challenge consists in expressing the censored demand for each time frame,
given the demand and booking limits of all the prior time frames.
Determining the expected censored demands
The rather straight-forward geometrical approach used in the previous chapter to find
the expected values of the censored TF2 demand can be extended to three or more
dimensions, with some modifications. For all TFi with i > 2, we shall still be able to
define four possible regions and analyse them one by one to determine the TFi cen-
sored demand. However, we will have to introduce convolution products to express
the probability density function of the sum of the previous time frames' censored
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demands. This step was not necessary in Chapter 4 because the probability function
of the censored TF1 demand was simply a truncated uniform distribution. However,
the probability density function of the sum of TF1 and TF2 censored demands is
altogether more complex, even though we assumed the underlying demands are uni-
form distributions. It is thanks to this simplified assumption that we can continue
deriving the expression of the censored demands for more time frames.
A generalized methodology to find the censored demand for all time frames is
described below. It is a recurring method.
Initialization - TF1
1. Define the probability density function f1 of the censored total demand in TF1.
2. Deduct the expected censored total demand naccepted,1. From Chapter 4, we
have:
. -1d - f + / 1 1 ( # 1 - 2 ) 2nece~es1= 2 4o-1
0-1
4
Recurrence - TFk for k > 2
1. Find the probability density function fk-1 of the sum
previous time frames' censored total demand.
k-1
[ Wcaceptd,i of all the
i=1
If k > 3, then:
fA-2 * Uk-1 (x)
k-1 (X) fk-2 * Uk-1 (t) dt
0
"k-1
if X i,1
if X k-1,
otherwise.
If k = 2, then fi is simply the function found in the first step of the initialization
process.
117
2. Define the four possible regions, as shown in Figure 5-1. The x-axis is the
k-1
sum of the previous time frames' censored demand, [j Tacpted,j. The y-axis
j=1
represents the underlying demand for the time frame of interest, TFk. The two
constraints considered are Zk_ and zk.
Region I is not affected by either constraint.
In Region II, the sum of the censored demand from TF1 to TFk-1 is lower than
the booking limit Zk_1. The other constraint, Zk, nonetheless, applies to the
sum of bookings from TF1 to TFk.
In Region III, the booking limit Zk-_ applies to sum of the accepted bookings
from TF1 to TFk-1: the sum is censored and only Zk bookings are accepted.
The sum of the censored demand from TF1 to TFk is, however, lower than the
capacity C. The TFk demand is therefore not capped.
In Region IV, both constraints apply: the number of accepted bookings from
the first k-1 time frames is equal to zk_1 and the bookings in the kth time frame
are censored to Zk - Zk_.
For each of one these four regions, we can find the ordinate of the barycentre,
and then deduct Tnc,pted,k.
3. Find the ordinate of Region II's barycentre when there are no constraints.
S() = f1 (t) dt, if X E [Z2- n2 - 0-2; z1]
0, otherwise
Deduct the area of Region II: Area f2a 2 g (y) dy. Normalize function g,
and note it G. Obtain the coordinate of the region's barycentre,
Ynocanstraints f f_±a2 yG (y) dy.fZ22-Z
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Figure 5-1: Constraints on the bookings in the two time frames
4. Find the ordinate of Region II's barycentre when the constraint zk is applied.
h (x) =(X z fA-1 (
10,
if x E [z2 - n2 - '2; z1]
otherwise
Normalize this function and note it H. Deduct the coordinate of the region's
barycentre, Ycostraints = In2 yH (y) dy.
5. Substitute to find Y1,11, the ordinate of Regions I and II's combined barycentre:
YII = pAk + (Yconstraints - Ynoconstraints)
6. Determine the ordinate of Region III's barycentre.
= 
1
YI11 =- (zk - zk_1 - Ain,k )
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Area
(zk_1 - min) 2 ak
Zk-,
The length of this region is (Zk - Zk_1 - Imin,k).
7. Determine the ordinate of Region IV's barycentre. In this region, the Zk book-
ing limit applies. Therefore, all the TFk bookings are capped to zk - zk_1, and
YIv = Zk - Zk_1. The length of this region is 2 0'k - (zk - Zk_1 - Mmin,k).
8. Deduct the ordinate of Regions III and IV's combined barycentre:
i Y k - (Zk - Zk-1 - Imin,k) ± y (Zk - Zk-1 - Pmin,k)
9. Deduct accepte,k from Y1,11 and YIII,Iv.
The function fi becomes more complex with each iteration. The initial advantage
presented by simplicity of the uniform distribution soon disappears as we go from one
truncated convolution product to another. Accordingly, the analysis of Region II,
steps 3 and 4 of the recurrence, becomes fairly complicated. The resulting Y1,11, the
ordinate of Regions I and II's combined barycentre, grows larger with each iteration,
involving an increasingly large number of variables. As the following example shows,
the approach is very quickly impractical. Heuristics may thus be more suitable to the
multiple-time frame joint pricing and seat allocation optimization problem.
Example with three time frames
The proposed methodology gives us the expected censored demand in TF3:
ifaccepted,3 - (1 - v) YI,1 + vYIII,Iv
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zi - Z 2 + Pmax,2 2 ymax,1 + pmax,2 - Z2 - Zl
4a12 2
(pmax,3 - Z 3 + Z2)3 . 4 E (Imax,i) + 3 (z 3 - z 2 ) + pmax,3
1603 (z 2 - Atmin,1 - /min,2) 3 E (pmax,i) + 2 (z 3 - z 2 ) + ptmax,3
Z3 -Z2 + 1 3  (3 - z 3 + z2 ) 2 aIIIIV 
- 2 40-3
The expression for Y,1I is already very complex. On the other hand, Yurr,rv's
form is not altered as we move from one time frame to the other. The main difficulty
does arise from the increasingly complex probability density function fi of the sum
of the censored demands.
5.3 Heuristics for Cases with more than Two Time
Frames
In light of the fact that the probability density function fi of the sum of the censored
demands is the main source of complexity, we derive three heuristics to the joint pric-
ing and seat allocation optimization. Each heuristic tackles the problem in a different
way.
With the first heuristic, we altogether bypass the complexity induced by fi by
simply assuming that the censored demands are independent. Convolutions are no
longer necessary, and the recurrence simply becomes the same as the initialization.
With the second heuristic, we also focus on the first step of the recurrence. How-
ever, the change is more subtle. We smooth out fi by imposing that it be a uniform
distribution. This greatly simplifies the subsequent steps 3 and 4 of the recurrence.
With the third heuristic, we acknowledge the simplicity of the problem formulation
when the number of time periods is kept to two and use dichotomy to revert to this
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case systematically.
Heuristic One - Non-nested Inventory
The nested characteristic of our model is at the root of the increased complexity of
the objective function. The expected censored demands are all interrelated. Indeed,
the booking limit zi applies not only to the demand in TFi but also to the sum
of the censored demands from all the anterior time frames. As a consequence, the
censored demand for the ih time frame is a function of its own and all the previous
time frame's booking limits z, expected demand p, and demand uncertainty o. The
expression does not scale up.
Relaxing the nested assumption and imposing a partitioned inventory rule instead
could greatly simplify the analysis. In the first proposed heuristic, the time frames
are no longer nested: if the demand during a time frame is lower than the booking
limit, the remaining unsold seats are considered lost and are not available for booking
in subsequent time frames. Under this rule, the objective function is:
k
i=1
with, Vi E [2, ... , k]
nitotali [pixi + (1 - pi) yi], if ntota,i < zi;
zi [pixi + (1 - pi) yi], otherwise.
k
We then have zi = C. The revenue function R is identical to the previous
i=1
chapter's TF1 revenue function. Therefore, the expected revenue function for all time
frames is given by the simple equation:
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k-total [pixi + (1 - Pi) Yi ]accepted,i
i=1
pi, if zi Pi + os;
withi, naccepted,i 2 - - -, if zi [- i - O;h ±i + J];2 4ai 4
zi, otherwise.
The objective function is greatly simplified.
We shall now analyze how this simplification affects the outcome of the optimiza-
tion. The simplicity of the heuristic is due to the fact that we ignore a portion of
possible bookings, as shown in red in Figure 5-3. The extra revenue generated when
unsold seats from previous time frames are available to ulterior time frames is not
taken into account by the new problem formulation. If the later time frames' average
fare is higher than the earlier time frames' average fare, then the optimization pro-
cess will either tend to increase the booking limit for the later time frame or tend to
decrease the fares in an attempt to increase the average censored demand. However,
k
since zi = C, this will have the consequence of lowering the earlier booking limit or
i=1
increasing the fares. Thus, this heuristic will be more conservative than the stochastic
model in the first time frames. The heuristic will recommend a lower booking limit
early on to protect more seats for the later time frames. Furthermore, the optimal
fares set by the heuristic are likely to be higher than those proposed by the stochastic
model. As a result, the total accepted demand will not be as high. However, since
the fares are likely to be higher than with the stochastic model, it is difficult to assess
how the revenues will decrease.
When implementing this heuristic, the booking limits should ideally be "re-nested".
The first time frame's booking limit zi remains unchanged, but for TFi with i > 1
i
the booking limit should be set to Z Zk. By doing so, we mitigate the revenue loss
k=1
by ensuring that unsold seats from previous time frames become available to ulterior
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TF2 UnderlyingDemand
p1 Zij p+ 1,
TF1 Underlying
Demand
Figure 5-2: Possible bookings ignored by the first heuristic
time frames.
Heuristic Two - Simplified Probability Density Function
With the first heuristic, we simplify the analysis by assuming the demands for the
different time frames are independent of each other. This approach is conservative
and ignores some of the potential revenues. Another alternative would consist in
simplifying the probability density function of the sum of the censored demand while
keeping the nested structure of the demand.
Much of the difficulty arises from the increasing complexity of the function fA, the
i
probability density function the sum of the censored demands E Waccept of TF1
j=1
to TFi. As described in the first step of the recurrence, in Section 5.2, the function is
the convolution product of the previous time frame's f._1 and a uniform distribution.
The complexity of convolution product increases with the index of the time frame,
and reflects in the following steps of the recurrence. Therefore, one alternative would
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tlota,2 = C - ntotaI
P2 + CT2
Z2
A 2
P2 - C2 -T--
TF3 Bookings
n3 = Z 
1
3 2, = C
TF2 Bookings
n2 = z2
TFI Bookings
Figure 5-3: Possible bookings ignored by the first heuristic
consist in simplifying this function.
For example, the convolution product can be replaced by a new uniform distribu-
tion: For k > 2,
1
k-1
-1 Amax,k - Zk-1
k-1
0
k-1
if X E [Iymin,i, Zk-1 ,
if X = Zk-1,
otherwise.
Figure 5-4 illustrates the change in the probability density function this imposes.
This change enables us to draw insights from the two period example. The new
probability density function fi_1 has the form of f2. Therefore, we can use the results
found for the censored demand for TF2 in the two-time period problem and generalize
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k-1 (X) =
i
Real Probabiliti' Density Function fAi
SubstiitteProbabilivDensitv Function k,
k-I k-4 I
k-I
k-I
Figure 5-4: Change in the probability density function
it. The expected revenues are therefore:
k
tata= 7Taccepted,i [Xjpi + (1 - pi) yi|
i=1
with, for k = 1,
and, for k > 2,
7accepted,k - k (k + 0- k - k +k- 
1 Zk) 3
12o~k (Zk-1 - I-equi + Oequi)J
4Zk - Zk-1 + 11k
2
{Ak - Zk + Zk-1)2 Ok
(Zk-1 - MIequi + o'equi)
2 0equi
1/equi + O'equi - Zk-1
20-eui4]
k-1 k-1
where Mequi = tk, and 0-equi = U-
i=1 i=1
126
Taccepted, 1 =
z2+ -
2
{M- Z)2
4o-
0-
4
4o-k
TFI TF2 TF3 TFk-1 TFkI I I .. - - -I - - --
Start of selling period Flight departure
M M
Step 1:
TFk-1 TFIk-Step 2: TI.k-R
1 1F F F
Step k-1:
Figure 5-5: Dichotomy
Heuristic Three - Dichotomy
The two-time period problem formulation was fairly simple. We therefore suggest
the use of dichotomy to unravel the process and revert to the two-time period case
systematically.
We first divide the selling horizon into two time frames, TF1 and TF2. We deter-
mine the set of fares and booking limit zi that result in the maximum total expected
revenues from those time frames, based the two time period joint optimization ap-
proach described earlier in this chapter. We then further divide TF1 into two new
intervals. The joint optimization approach can be applied again to those two new
intervals, once the total number of seats available to the demands from those time
frames is set to zi. We repeat this step k - 2 times, until all the time frames are
covered.
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Figure 5-6: First steps of the heuristic
5.4 Performance Analysis
As we have in the previous chapters, we use a numerical example to illustrate the
approaches newly introduced and assess their various performance. The numerical
example in this chapter will have three time frames.
We expand the results from Chapter 3 to find the deterministic model's optimal
solution to this multiple-time frame joint pricing and seat allocation problem. The
revenues obtained with the deterministic solution will be used as a benchmark. The
optimal solutions of the other four approaches, the stochastic model and its three
heuristics, will be compared to this first model's output and simulations will then be
run to assess the performance of each approach.
The assumed parameters for the demands in the three time frames considered are
given in Table 5.1. The flight capacity is 100 seats. All else being held constant,
the total demand decreases as the time frame considered is closer to the departure
date. On the other hand, the passengers become less price sensitive. The standard
deviation decreases with the total demand. At the same time, all else being equal,
people seem to be more inclined to choose the higher fare product as we get closer to
departure, even if there is not much difference between the last two time frames. All
these are characteristics observed when analyzing real booking data.
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TF1 TF2 TF3
Total Demand notalte ai 110 0 2 =66 a3 -44
#1 =0.35 32= 0.19 P3 3 0.10
ai = 1.023 a2 = 0.512 a3 -- 0.022
Probability pt b1 = 0.022 b2 = 0.019 b3  0.016
ci = 0.001 c2 = 0.009 c3 = 0.008
Standard deviation s1 = 16 S2 10 Sa= 7
Table 5.1: Parameters for the demand functions
Deterministic Model
All the results from Chapter 3 can be extended to the multiple-time frame problem.
The booking limits zi are all redundant variables. The optimization problem is given
below:
Maximize R = fntota,ipiXi + notat,i (1 - pi) Yi
Subject to Zai - #,yi - C < 0
The optimal deterministic solution to this joint pricing and seat allocation prob-
lem is obtained with Matlab. The maximum total revenue is reached with the fares
and booking limit outlined in Table 5.2. In the simulations we will set the booking
limits as follows: zi = a, - #1iy and z2 = E ai - piyl.
Based on the assumed parameters, we can deduce the censored demand and rev-
enues implied by those fares and nested booking limits.
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TF1 TF2 TF3
Fare Product 1 z* $336.8 x* = $376.1 xz = $484.5
Fare Product 2 y* $174.4 y* = $185.7 y* = $239.2
Implied booking limit z* = 49 z* = 79
Table 5.2: Optimal solution for the deterministic model
TF1 TF2 TF3 Total
Average fare ($) 237 265 361
Underlying Demand 48.6 30.4 21.0 100.0
Table 5.3: Fares and demand implied by the deterministic model's output
Stochastic Model
The censored demand for the first two time frames are detailed in the previous chap-
ter. We will use the equations derived from the recurring methodology proposed in
Section 5.2 to determine the expected censored demand for the third and last time
frame. This enables us to find the stochastic model's exact optimal solution for this
three-time frame problem. Table 5.4 shows this optimal solution.
The stochastic model's optimal fares are higher than the deterministic model's
fares in all three time frames. This is consistent with the findings of Chapter 4: the
fares are used as a means of lowering the underlying demand and lessen the impact
of the flight capacity on the censored demand. However, the gaps closes-in as we get
to the last time frame. The load factor will subsequently be much lower than when
the deterministic output is implemented. However, because seats are protected for
the later arriving but higher revenue passengers, and because the fares are higher on
average, the revenues should be greater overall. From Chapter 4's numerical example,
we can expected an increase in revenues around 2-3% .
Based on the assumed parameters, we can deduce the censored demand and rev-
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Fare Product 1
Fare Product 2
Implied booking limit
TF1
X* = $368.7
y* = $195.7
z* = 65
TF2
x= $401.3
y* = $202.7
z2*= 87
TF3
x= $498.9
y; = $248.8
Table 5.4: Optimal solution for the stochastic model
TF1 TF2 TF3 Total
Average fare ($) 269 290 375
Underlying Demand 41.1 27.1 20.1 88.3
Accepted Bookings 40.8 25.5 18.1 84.4
Revenues (k$) - = 11.0 7 = 7.4 * = 6.8 7mOt = 25.2
Table 5.5: Fares and demands implied by the stochastic model's output
enues implied by those fares and booking limit, summarized in Table 5.5. The optimal
fares and booking limit determined with the stochastic approach should result in a
total expected censored demand of 84.6, or an average load factor of 84.6%. The
expected total revenue is $25.2k.
Heuristic One
With the first heuristic, we assume that the inventory is partitioned instead of being
nested across time frames and we solve for the corresponding joint optimal solution.
The optimal set of fares and booking limits is shown in Table 5.6.
The first time frame's fares are very close to the stochastic model's TF1 fares.
However, the other ones are higher than for the stochastic model and thus much higher
than they were in the deterministic case. The booking limits on the other hand are
very low. At most, we will have accepted z1 + z2 = 76 passengers by the end of the
second time frame, versus 87 in the stochastic case. The load factor corresponding to
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TF1 TF2 TF3
Fare Product 1 *= $369.0 x = $408.9 x* = $519.3
Fare Product 2 y* $195.8 y* = $207.7 y* = $262.3
Implied booking limit z* = 46 z = 76
Table 5.6: Optimal solution for the non-nested heuristic
TF1 TF2 TF3 Total
Average fare ($) 269 297 396
Underlying Demand 41.1 26.1 18.8 86.0
Table 5.7: Fares and demands implied by the non-nested heuristic's output
the first heuristic is expected to be very low.
Heuristic Two
For the second heuristic, we revert back to the nested inventory structure but simplify
the probability density function.
shown in Table 5.8.
The optimal solution for this second heuristic is
TF1 TF2 TF3
Fare Product 1 X* = $369.9 x* = $396.3 x* = $503.7
Fare Product 2 y* = $196.4 y; = $199.3 y* =$252.0
Implied booking limit z* = 69 z = 82
Table 5.8: Optimal solution for the second heuristic
TF1 TF2 TF3 Total
Average fare ($) 270 285 380
Underlying Demand 40.9 27.7 19.8 88.4
Table 5.9: Fares and demands implied by the second heuristic's output
These fares are very closed to those determined by the stochastic model. There
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is at most a $5 difference. The second booking limit, however, is a bit lower than it
were with the stochastic model.
Heuristic Three
The third heuristic is based on dichotomy. The optimal solution is outlined in Table
5.10.
The other two heuristics mostly had higher fares than the stochastic model. This
last heuristic, on the contrary, seems to warrant much lower fares, especially early
on. In the three time frames, the fares are between the deterministic and stochastic
optimal fares and this is combined to the highest booking limits so far: 74 and 91
for the first and second time frame, respectively. The lower fares and high booking
limits ought to result in a higher number of accepted bookings in the first two time
frames. Nevertheless, since it is also accompanied by a lower average fare, the impact
on the total revenues is unsure. In the last time frame, there should be fewer accepted
bookings due to the limited number of remaining seats. The TF3 revenue may very
be low.
TF1 TF2 TF3
Fare Product 1 x* = $352.0 x* = $381.8 x* = $491.9
Fare Product 2 y= $184.6 y= $189.5 y $244.7
Implied booking limit z = 74 z4 = 91
Table 5.10: Optimal solution for the dichotomy heuristic
TF1 TF2 TF3 Total
Average fare ($) 252 270 369
Underlying Demand 45.0 29.6 20.5 95.1
Table 5.11: Fares and demands implied by the dichotomy heuristic's output
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Simulations with the optimal set of fares and booking limit
We now compare the performance of those five different approaches by implementing
the proposed fares and booking limits and simulating the demand.
In this chapter too, the total demand for the two fare products is a random vari-
able generated at the beginning of each time period. We will again test two possible
probability density functions: a uniform and a Gaussian probability density function.
In the first set of simulations, the demand is uniformly distributed in all three time
frames. In a second set of simulations, the demand is normally distributed in all three
time frames. The demands for the three time frames are independent. For both type
of demands, we generate 1,000 samples. The mean total demand is a linear function
of the lower fare, yi, and we use the same parameters, displayed in Table 5.1, to
model these expected values. The standard deviations of the demands in TF1, TF2
and TF3 are 16, 10 and 7, respectively, which corresponds to about a third of the
deterministic demand for each time frame. For the normal distribution, the demand
is truncated in order to prevent any instance of negative demand.
The booking constraints or the flight capacity do not affect the probability that
a passenger chooses the higher fare product. We run five scenarios for each type of
probability density function:
1. simulations with the deterministic optimal fares and booking limits;
2. simulations with the stochastic optimal fares and booking limits;
3. simulations with the first, non-nested inventory, heuristic's optimal fares and
booking limits;
4. simulations with the optimal fares and booking limits of the second heuristic,
with the simplified demand probability density function;
5. and, finally, simulations with the optimal fares and booking limits of the thrid
and last heuristic, based on dichotomy.
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Tables 5.12 and 5.13 summarize the findings. The estimated average censored
demands are very close to the predicted censored demands for the stochastic model.
In the case of the uniform distribution, the relative difference between the simulated
censored demand and the predicted average censored demand is -1.2%, -0.1% and
1.0% for TF1, TF2 and TF3, respectively. The final load factor is 84.6% and the
total revenues are as expected equal to $25.1k. This represents a 2.8% increase in
revenues from the deterministic case. Nevertheless, as observed in the previous chap-
ters, the load factor is also lower with the stochastic fares and booking limits than
the with the deterministic solution.
The stochastic model is based on the uniform distribution and the relative dif-
ferences between the theoretical and simulated results for the three time frames are
therefore slightly larger for the Gaussian distribution. Since, the Gaussian distribu-
tion gives more weight to the mean of the underlying demand, the expected censored
demand for this distribution type lies between the uniform distributions' -nt&j and
[y and the estimated average censored demands are thus higher for the Gaussian dis-
tribution. The revenues are consequently larger with the Gaussian distribution than
the uniform one.
7accepted,1
Waccepted,2
7accepted,3
Load factor
Rtotai (k$)
Change in rev.
Deterministic Stochastic
Model Model
42.2 40.3
27.2 25.5
19.9 18.3
89.3% 84.1%
24.4 25.1
from deterministic 2.8%
Heuristic
One
36.2
24.9
18.6
79.6%
24.5
0.4%
Heuristic
Two
40.4
24.6
18.4
83.5%
24.9
2.2%
Heuristic
Three
45.3
26.6
16.6
88.4%
24.7
1.3%
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Table 5.12: Average censored demands and revenues, for a uniform demand distribution
Deterministic Stochastic Heuristic Heuristic Heuristic
Model Model One Two Three
Waccepted,1 42.5 40.5 37.1 40.0 44.6
iaccepted,2 27.6 26.1 25.1 25.7 28.2
7Taccpted,3 19.7 18.1 18.3 18.1 16.8
Load factor 89.8% 84.8% 80.6% 83.8% 89.6%
Riotai (k$) 24.5 25.3 24.7 25.0 25.1
Change in rev. from deterministic 3.1% 0.9% 2.1% 2.4%
Table 5.13: Average censored demands and revenues, for a Gaussian demand distribution
Deterministic
Model
TF3
TF2
TF1
Total 89.8
Bookings andAverage Fare ($)
Stochastic Heuristic Heuristic
Model One Two
I I 0 0ol
361
265
237
375
290
269
84.8
396
297
269
80.6
380
285
270
Heuristic
Three
00 o
369
270
252
83.8 89.6
Figure 5-7: Accepted demand by time frame
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Revenues (k$)
Deterministic Stochastic Heuristic Heuristic Heuristic
Model Model One Two Three
6.8
TF3
TF2 7.6O 73
TF1
Total 24.5 25.3 24.7 25.0 25.1
Figure 5-8: Revenue by time frame
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Figure 5-9: Differences between the stochastic model and the heuristics - uniform distribution
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The highest revenues are obtained with the stochastic solution and the lowest with
the deterministic one. The first heuristic, with the partitioned inventory, not only
leads to the lowest revenues of all heuristics, but also to the lowest load factor overall.
This heuristic only provides a 0.4 - 0.9% increase in revenues from the deterministic
revenues, and the associated total number of bookings is in the low 80's, which is
about 9 points lower than the 89% deterministic load factor.
The second heuristic, with the simplified demand probability density function,
provides a steady 2.1 - 2.2% increase in revenues. For this numerical example, this
heuristic is the best of all three when the demand is uniformly distributed. With a
load factor only 0.6 points lower than the 84.1% of the stochastic load factor, and a
small 0.6% decrease in revenues from the stochastic revenues, this heuristic seems to
be a good approach to the multiple-time period joint optimization problem, when the
actual demand is uniformly distributed, as assumed by the heuristic. As shown on
Figures 5-9, the changes in fares or bookings are minimal with this heuristic. Conse-
quently, the impact on the revenue is small.
However, it should also be noted that when the demand is normally distributed,
the best heuristic is the third one. Indeed, while it still outperforms the determinis-
tic solution or the first heuristic's solution, the second heuristic's revenues and load
factor are lower than the third's. With a load factor in the high 80's, second only to
the deterministic load factor, the third heuristic also exhibit the second best revenues
overall: $25. 1k, a 2.4% increase from the base case. The third heuristic's load factor
is also very high when the demand is uniformly distributed. As anticipated, the low
fares and high booking limits warranted by the third heuristic fostered the demand in
the first two time frames. The bubble chart of Figure 5-9 shows how this combination
of factors generated a large increase in revenues in TF1, mitigating the overall loss
and largely increasing the overall number of accepted bookings.
The last two heuristics perform well. Heuristic Two, which assumed a simplified
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probability density function for later time frames, exhibited a consistent 2.1 - 2.2%
revenue increase from the deterministic case. This heuristic's optimal solution is
close to the stochastic optimal solution and changes in fares, bookings and revenues
are minimal. More importantly, the changes in revenues are more balanced across
time frames. With this heuristic, one can expect good revenues from the last time
frame, which usually is the time frame in which high revenue passengers materialized.
The third heuristic's good performance seems to rely mainly on the large number of
bookings from the first time frame. This heuristic, based on dichotomy, is in a sense
less risky by putting the emphasis on TF1 rather than TF3. In the numerical example
considered, this third heuristic seems to be the best under the assumption that the
demand is normally distributed. To generalize this finding, we would have to run
more tests. However, one possible explanation to the fact that the second heuristic is
not as good with a normal distribution is that, by construction, this heuristic relies
heavily on the uniform distribution. It therefore systematically underestimates the
number of accepted bookings.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we consider the multiple-time frame joint pricing and seat alloca-
tion optimization problem. A generalized methodology is outlined to determine the
expression of all the censored demands, and therefore derive the objective revenue
function. However, the probability density function of the sum of censored demands
becomes very quickly overly complex. The censored demand for a third time frame
already involves an important number of variables and is difficult to handle. In light
of the increasingly complexity arising from the probability density function, we derive
three heuristics to the joint pricing and seat allocation optimization problem.
A numerical example is used to illustrate the performance of these three heuristics.
To compare the results with those obtained with the deterministic and stochastic ap-
proaches, we limit ourselves to a three-time frame numerical example. The stochastic
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solution yields the best revenues overall, and all three heuristics outperformed the
deterministic model. In particular, two of the three heuristics provided very good
revenues.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
We conclude the dissertation by summarizing the results and contributions of our
research. We also discuss implementation challenges of the optimization methods. We
then propose possible extensions of our models and suggest future research directions.
6.1 Research findings and contributions
Pricing and revenue management are two essential levers to maximize the sales of an
airline's seat inventory and increase revenues. The two processes are complementary
and interrelated. Both share the ultimate goal of maximizing the expected revenues
of the airline and both affect the consumer's choice set. By setting fares and travel
constraints, pricing defines the global set of options that could be available to a pas-
senger. Booking limits, on the other hand, may render one or more of these options
unavailable at the time of booking and therefore restrict the actual choice set of a
passenger. The two processes have, nevertheless, traditionally been studied and even
practised separately. For decades, researchers have considered them as two distinct
optimization problems.
Researchers started addressing the issue of airline joint pricing and seat allocation
optimization in the late 1990's. The papers published since then have either addressed
the multiple-product single-time-period problem or the single-product, multiple-time-
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period problem. Some studies put a particular emphasis on joint optimization within
a network, or in the presence of a competitor. Few studies proposed a simultaneous
optimization of pricing and seat allocation. Most of them relied on an iterative ap-
proach, optimizing pricing first and then turning to seat allocation.
This research complements the existing body of work by addressing the multiple-
product, multiple time frame joint pricing and seat allocation optimization problem.
We placed ourselves in a single carrier, single OD market environment to remove any
network or competitive effects. We first considered two time frames only. Two fare
products are offered. The demands for the products are mutually dependent. The
objective is to maximize the revenue generated by the sale of the two products by
simultaneously determining the optimal fares and booking limit for the two products
over the course of the two time periods.
We started with the simple deterministic case. The demand, a function of the
products' prices, is assumed to be deterministic. This allowed us to show that the
booking limit on the first time period's bookings is, in the deterministic case, a re-
dundant variable. The number of decision variables is thus reduced to four, which
simplifies the optimization problem. The deterministic model offers a rapid solution
to the problem and is used as a benchmark to test more elaborate approaches.
We tested the optimal solution of the deterministic model in a stochastic environ-
ment, with simulations in which the demand generated is a random variable. The
simulation results show that the deterministic model can provide a 3% increase in
revenues over a traditional revenue management approach, even when the demand is
uncertain. Furthermore, the simulations confirm the benefits of enforcing the booking
limit when the demand is stochastic. By protecting a minimum number of seats from
being sold to early, low-revenue passengers, the booking limit enables the airline to
improve its expected revenues.
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In Chapter 4, we introduced stochasticity in the model by assuming that, for each
time frame, the total demand for the two fare products is a uniformly distributed
random variable. The mean of the underlying demand is still a function of the lower
fare. The presence of a limit on the total number of bookings that can be accepted
in a time frame can increase the expected revenues. It thus becomes critical to un-
derstand the impact of the booking limit and the capacity on the accepted number
of bookings, the censored demand.
We chose the uniform probability density function over the more commonly used
Gaussian distribution after realizing that the latter distribution is at the root of the
greatest difficulties encountered by researchers working on joint optimization. The
probability density function of the sum of two independent random variables is the
convolution product of their individual density functions. While the convolution of
two unbounded Gaussian probability density functions is a simple Gaussian prob-
ability density function, there is no closed-form expression for the convolution of
bounded Gaussian distributions. This is not the case for the uniform distribution.
Furthermore, the uniform distribution can ultimately be used to model the Gaussian
distribution, since the Gaussian function can be seen as the limit of a sum of uniform
functions.
The uniform distribution presents the advantage of allowing us to derive the
closed-form solution to the problem, through a geometrical analogy. The impact
of the booking limit and the flight capacity on the underlying demands of the two
time frames can be shown on a two-dimension graph, as displayed in Figure 6-1. The
geometrical analysis of the two constraints' impact on the underlying demand allows
us to derive the closed-form expression of the two time frames' censored demand, and
by extension the objective revenue function.
Simulations confirm the benefits of accounting for the demand uncertainty and
the constraints imposed on the demand in the problem formulation. The simulations
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Figure 6-1: Divide and conquer
show that the stochastic model can provide a substantial 2% revenue increase over the
deterministic model or a 3-4% increase from a more traditional revenue management
approach with near-optimal fixed fares. We also showed that the approach behaves
well in an stochastic environment where the demand is normally distributed.
Finally, the stochastic optimization model was extended to account for additional
time frames. A recursion was proposed to derive the exact form of the censored de-
mand for all the time frames considered. However, the approach does not scale up
very well, as illustrated by an example. The compounded effects of successive book-
ing limits, the increasing number of parameters and variables, all greatly increase the
complexity of the censored demands. We therefore further analyzed the character-
istics of our model to identify the origins of the recursion's complexity. Based on
our understanding of the features that can be simplified, we proposed three different
heuristics.
A first heuristic, which assumes that the capacity allocated to one time frame is
not available to any other time frame was suggested. In order words, we assumed
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that the demands for the different time frames are independent of each other. We
showed that this approach is attractive for its facilitated implementation but ignores
an important revenue source. The extra revenue that can be generated when unsold
seats from previous time frames are available to later time frames is not taken into
account by this first heuristic.
The two other heuristics keep the nested structure of the inventory over the mul-
tiple time frames intact. We focused on simplifying the probability density functions
of the demand in the different time frames. In the second heuristic, we assumed
that the density function of the sum of the censored demands is uniform. Much
of the recursion difficulty comes from the increasing complexity of this probability
density function. Determining the exact expression of the convolution products of
bounded uniform distributions is possible, but becomes rapidly difficult as more and
more variables are introduced. We proposed to not compute the exact expression and
approximate it instead by a uniform distribution, with a similar mean and standard
deviation.
Lastly, we used dichotomy and the results from the initial stochastic model to
derive the third heuristic. The two-time period problem formulation in Chapter 4 is
fairly simple. We therefore suggested the use of dichotomy to unravel the multiple-
time period process and revert to the two-time period case systematically.
A numerical example was used to illustrate the performance of these three heuris-
tics. To compare the results with those obtained with the deterministic and stochastic
approaches, we limited ourselves to a three-time frame numerical example. Although
the stochastic solution yields the best revenues overall, all three heuristics outperform
the deterministic model. In particular, the last two heuristics perform very when com-
pared to the stochastic and deterministic models. The second heuristics results in a
revenue increase of about 2% from the deterministic solution, which represents 60%
of the potential increase from the stochastic solution. The third heuristic performed
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very well under the assumption that the demand is normally distributed, with a 2.4%
increase in revenues from the deterministic solution. This increase corresponds to
about 75% of the stochastic solution's potential increase.
6.2 Implementation challenges
The models developed in this dissertation can enable an airline to effectively merge
the practice of pricing and revenue management. There seems to be a trend in this
direction among major airlines and our methods can be a starting point for a few
appropriate markets.
The proposed approaches have the potential to improve the revenue of an airline
by 2-3%. However, the models do not account for any network or competitive effects.
The joint pricing and seat allocation heuristics could therefore first be implemented
in markets where the airline has very few connecting passengers, to mitigate any
network effects. Most importantly, the airline should also pick markets in which it
has not only a large market share, but also pricing power. If the airline has a large
market share, it should have a more comprehensive understanding of the underlying
demand characteristics. Furthermore, estimating the relationship between a market's
total demand and the fares requires the ability to change the market's lowest fare
and observe how this change affects the demand. It is therefore crucial to have the
pricing power for the origin-destination markets in question.
Once the origin-destination markets are chosen, the airline will have to calibrate
the model's demand functions. Historical data may not be fit for regressions. For
example, the price variations over a period of time could be too small. The airline
may then have to run small-scale pricing experiments to unveil the characteristics of
the underlying total demand and estimate the model's parameters. Booking limits
imposed by the airline during the booking period may constrain the observed demand.
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To get to the underlying demand, one possibility would be to use the equations devel-
oped in this dissertation and reverse engineer them. Based on the observed number
of bookings, the booking limits, and the fares, one could use the Chapter 4's formulae
to run regressions and find the corresponding underlying demand characteristics.
When total demand and probability coefficients are estimated for all time frames,
the airline can run one of the heuristics to jointly optimize pricing and seat alloca-
tion. We believe that Heuristic Two, with simplified probability density functions,
and Heuristic Three, based on dichotomy, are the most effective of the three heuristics.
Implementing the heuristic's optimal set of fares and booking limit may be not be
straight-forward. Filing the optimal set of fares with third party vendors may require
some flexibility and advance notice. Some airlines with innovative fare structures may
have already experienced similar difficulties with global distribution systems. Never-
theless, the models can relatively easily be implemented on an airline's own website.
Depending on the revenue management system in place, the airline users may have
to overwrite the system's own booking limits to ensure that the heuristic's optimal
solution is enforced on the origin-destination markets of interest. The airline may also
decide to impose additional booking limits on the lower fare products, as discussed
in Section 4.5.3, to mitigate the risk of an abnormally low buy-up rate during the
booking process.
Our models for joint pricing and seat allocation optimization can easily be first
used as a joint pricing and revenue management guideline by many airlines. Finding
the optimal corresponding set of fares and booking limits can provide insightful pricing
recommendations very quickly and efficiently, even with current revenue management
environments.
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6.3 Future research directions
The research presented in this dissertation can be expanded. We propose several
research directions:
1. Modify the total demand function to account for both fares
In the current demand formulation, the total demand is a function of the lower
fare only. We assume that changing Fare Product l's fare does not alter the
OD market's total underlying demand. We showed that this assumption holds
for OD markets and fare structures such that the number of consumers that
will only consider Fare Product 1 is relatively small compared to the total
demand and that these consumers are relatively price inelastic. However, there
are markets in which this assumption is not be applicable. It would then be
appropriate to include the second fare xi in the total demand function as well.
The geometrical analogy could be used to find the impact of booking limits on
the combined demands of the two groups.
2. Extend the model to more fare products
The research could be extended to account for more than two fare products. We
focused on improving the model by extending it to account for additional time
frames. Dividing the selling horizon into more but smaller time frames, which
airlines do in reality, helps match more closely the changing characteristics of
passengers over the booking process. However, most airline also offer multiple
fare products. To introduce additional products in our model, the demand
formulation would have to be adapted. The total demand function is likely to
be mostly dependent on a few number of fares, and may therefore not require
much changes if the first suggested research direction is undertaken first. The
probability that a passenger will choose of the multiple products will however
have to be adapted. The logit model may no longer be appropriate and the
interactions between the fare products will have to be further analysed.
3. Include network effects
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The stochastic model could be extended to take into account network effects. If
we consider a network of flights, then the demand for different fare products for
different origin-destination markets will be competing for the same resources,
the flight capacity. In short, the sum of the demands for the different origin-
destination markets will be capped by the flight's total capacity. Prior work on
multiple fare products could be useful if we assume that some the fare products
are for local passengers while the rest is designed for connecting passengers. The
geometrical analogy could be used again to find the impact of booking limits
on the different types of demands.
4. Introduce a competitor
This research could also serve as a mean of introducing a competitor. We could
imagine having two airlines, Airline 1 and its competitor, Airline 2. To simplify
the first analysis we could assume that each airline only offers one fare product,
and that the pricing strategy of Airline 2 is known and stable. The capacity
of each airline is also known. Airline 1 offers Fare Product 1 and Airline 2
offers Fare Product 2, but the average fare for Fare Product 2 over the booking
period can be anticipated. Then the objective would be to find the set of fares
and booking limits that would maximize Airline 1's revenues, given Airline 2's
pricing strategy and the two airlines' capacities. To successfully implement this
model, an airline will have to have very good forecasting capabilities.
In this dissertation, we developed a stochastic model to determine simultaneously
the set of fares and the first time period's booking limit that maximize the revenue
generated by the sale of two fare products over two time periods. We further proposed
three heuristics to tackle the multiple-time period joint pricing and seat allocation
problem. The performance of the model and the heuristics in the few numerical
examples used are very promising. The proposed approaches have the potential to
improve the revenue of an airline by 2-4%. This model should enable an airline to
effectively merge the practice of pricing and revenue management. There seems to
be a trend in this direction among major airlines and this method can be a starting
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point in a few appropriate markets.
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